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Institutions And Economic Development: Disentangling The Role Of Contracting And Property Rights Institutions

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  • MICHAEL LOBSIGER

    (University of Bern)

  • MARC ZAHNER

    (University of Bern)

Abstract

This paper aims at estimating the effect of different types of institutions on economic development. To tackle the endogeneity problem that is prevalent, an identification strategy exploiting the heteroskedasticity in the data is used. This also allows to analyze the reverse effect, running from economic development to institutions. In a sample of about 100 countries, an impact of property rights institutions but not contracting institutions on economic development is detected. Furthermore, the results suggest that a higher level of economic development improves contracting institutions, but not property rights institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Lobsiger & Marc Zahner, 2012. "Institutions And Economic Development: Disentangling The Role Of Contracting And Property Rights Institutions," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 37(2), pages 1-34, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:jed:journl:v:37:y:2012:i:2:p:1-34
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 131-165, June.
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    4. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    5. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    6. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    7. Edinaldo Tebaldi & Bruce Elmslie, 2008. "Institutions, Innovation And Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 33(2), pages 27-53, December.
    8. Roberto Rigobon, 2003. "Identification Through Heteroskedasticity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 777-792, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fiona Kun Yao & Kaifeng Jiang & Danielle R. Combs & Song Chang, 2022. "Informal institutions and absorptive capacity: A cross-country meta-analytic study," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 53(6), pages 1091-1109, August.
    2. Stefan D. Josten, 2013. "Middle-Class Consensus, Social Capital And The Fundamental Causes Of Economic Growth And Development," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 38(1), pages 1-26, March.
    3. Getachew, Yamlaksira S. & Beamish, Paul W., 2021. "Unbundling the effects of host-country institutions on foreign subsidiary survival: A case for subsidiary heterogeneity," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(4).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic Development; Institution; Property Rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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