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Top Managerial Prestige and Organizational Bankruptcy

Author

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  • Richard A. D'Aveni

    (Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755)

Abstract

This paper extends earlier work on an alternative view of bankruptcy suggesting that bankruptcy occurs when creditors withdraw then support from a firm's top management team. It further proposes that support for the top team depends upon the team's prestige. Five characteristics measuring the relative status of top teams were tested for their association with bankruptcy. Three of the characteristics focused on items commonly associated with membership in economic elites elite educational backgrounds, board memberships, and previous employment as officers in other corporations. The fourth and fifth characteristics focused on membership in political and military elites. The results indicated that political and board connections were negatively associated with bankruptcy in the year of failure, even when financial factors and cooptive board linkages were controlled. The results also showed that failing firms attempted to improve their managerial prestige three to four years before they failed. They were, however, unable to hold onto their gains because of the “bailout” by prestigious managers in the last two years before bankruptcy.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard A. D'Aveni, 1990. "Top Managerial Prestige and Organizational Bankruptcy," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 1(2), pages 121-142, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:1:y:1990:i:2:p:121-142
    DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1.2.121
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    Cited by:

    1. Stef, Nicolae & Zenou, Emmanuel, 2021. "Management-to-staff ratio and a firm's exit," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 252-260.
    2. Leiby, Justin, 2018. "The role of consultants and management prestige in management control system adoption," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 1-13.
    3. Amankwah-Amoah, Joseph, 2016. "An integrative process model of organisational failure," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(9), pages 3388-3397.
    4. Xia, Tianjiao & Liu, Xiaohui, 2022. "The innovation paradox of TMT political capital in transition economy firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 775-790.
    5. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Imants Paeglis & Karen Simonyan, 2011. "Management Quality and Antitakeover Provisions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 651-692.
    6. Huang, Haijie & Lee, Edward & Lyu, Changjiang & Zhu, Zhenmei, 2016. "The effect of accounting academics in the boardroom on the value relevance of financial reporting information," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 18-30.
    7. Florackis, Chris & Sainani, Sushil, 2018. "How do chief financial officers influence corporate cash policies?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 168-191.
    8. McKinley, William & Ponemon, Lawrence A. & Schick, Allen G., 1996. "Auditors' perceptions of client firms: The stigma of decline and the stigma of growth," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 193-213.
    9. Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kozłowski, Łukasz & Mielcarz, Paweł, 2014. "Political connections and operational performance of non-financial firms: New evidence from Poland," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 109-135.
    10. Pollock, Timothy G. & Chen, Guoli & Jackson, Eric M. & Hambrick, Donald C., 2010. "How much prestige is enough? Assessing the value of multiple types of high-status affiliates for young firms," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 6-23, January.
    11. Deore, Aishwarrya & Mahlendorf, Matthias D. & Wu, Fan, 2023. "CEOs' structural power, prestige power, and target ratcheting," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    12. Daily, Catherine M. & Certo, S. Trevis & Dalton, Dan R., 2005. "Investment bankers and IPO pricing: does prospectus information matter?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 93-111, January.
    13. Amankwah-Amoah, Joseph & Debrah, Yaw A. & Acquaah, Moses, 2023. "Business failures in institutionally weak environments: An examination of Virgin Atlantic’s failed adventure in sub-saharan africa," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(5).
    14. Ferris, Stephen P. & Jayaraman, Narayanan & Liao, Min-Yu (Stella), 2020. "Better directors or distracted directors? An international analysis of busy boards," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    15. Kannan-Narasimhan, Rangapriya (Priya) & Wang, Ruixiang & Zhu, Pengcheng, 2023. "Founder versus agent CEOs: Effects of founder status and power on firm innovation and cost of capital," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    16. Ciampi, Francesco, 2015. "Corporate governance characteristics and default prediction modeling for small enterprises. An empirical analysis of Italian firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(5), pages 1012-1025.

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