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When Is Selfish Routing Bad? The Price of Anarchy in Light and Heavy Traffic

Author

Listed:
  • Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi

    (Core Data Science Group, Facebook, Inc., London W1T 1FB, United Kingdom)

  • Roberto Cominetti

    (Facultad de Ingeniería y Ciencias, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, 7941169 Santiago, Chile)

  • Panayotis Mertikopoulos

    (Université Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Inria, Grenoble INP, LIG, 38000 Grenoble, France)

  • Marco Scarsini

    (Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali “Guido Carli,” 00197 Rome, Italy)

Abstract

This paper examines the behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin/destination (O/D) pairs. Empirical studies in real-world networks show that the price of anarchy is close to 1 in both light and heavy traffic, thus raising the following question: can these observations be justified theoretically? We first show that this is not always the case: the price of anarchy may remain a positive distance away from 1 for all values of the traffic inflow, even in simple three-link networks with a single O/D pair and smooth, convex costs. On the other hand, for a large class of cost functions (including all polynomials) and inflow patterns, the price of anarchy does converge to 1 in both heavy and light traffic, irrespective of the network topology and the number of O/D pairs in the network. We also examine the rate of convergence of the price of anarchy, and we show that it follows a power law whose degree can be computed explicitly when the network’s cost functions are polynomials.

Suggested Citation

  • Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi & Roberto Cominetti & Panayotis Mertikopoulos & Marco Scarsini, 2020. "When Is Selfish Routing Bad? The Price of Anarchy in Light and Heavy Traffic," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 411-434, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:68:y:2020:i:2:p:411-434
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.2019.1894
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shaler Stidham, 2014. "The Price of Anarchy for a Network of Queues in Heavy Traffic," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: P. Simin Pulat & Subhash C. Sarin & Reha Uzsoy (ed.), Essays in Production, Project Planning and Scheduling, edition 127, chapter 5, pages 91-121, Springer.
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    3. José R. Correa & Andreas S. Schulz & Nicolás E. Stier-Moses, 2004. "Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 29(4), pages 961-976, November.
    4. Roughgarden, Tim & Tardos, Eva, 2004. "Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 389-403, May.
    5. Correa, José R. & Schulz, Andreas S. & Stier-Moses, Nicolás E., 2008. "A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 457-469, November.
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    Cited by:

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    4. Zijun Wu & Rolf H. Möhring & Yanyan Chen & Dachuan Xu, 2021. "Selfishness Need Not Be Bad," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 410-435, March.
    5. Wang, Aihu & Tang, Yuanhua & Mohmand, Yasir Tariq & Xu, Pei, 2022. "Modifying link capacity to avoid Braess Paradox considering elastic demand," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 605(C).
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    7. Zijun Wu & Rolf H. Moehring & Chunying Ren & Dachuan Xu, 2020. "A convergence analysis of the price of anarchy in atomic congestion games," Papers 2007.14769, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.

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