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Axiomatic Characterizations of the Raiffa and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions to the Bargaining Problem

Author

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  • Zvi A. Livne

    (Columbia University, New York, New York)

Abstract

The Raiffa Solution to the Bargaining Problem, proposed in 1951, has several appealing properties, especially when viewed as a model of the negotiation process in an integrative bargaining situation. Unlike the well known solutions of Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky, the Raiffa Solution has not been characterized by a set of axioms. We present two axiomatic characterizations of the Raiffa Solution. In addition, we present a new axiomatic characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Zvi A. Livne, 1989. "Axiomatic Characterizations of the Raiffa and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 37(6), pages 972-980, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:37:y:1989:i:6:p:972-980
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.37.6.972
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    Cited by:

    1. Qi Feng & Yuanchen Li & J. George Shanthikumar, 2022. "Negotiations in Competing Supply Chains: The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(8), pages 5868-5890, August.
    2. Emily Tanimura & Sylvie Thoron, 2016. "How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree?," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(03), pages 1-17, September.
    3. Lahiri S., 1996. "Expansion independence in choice problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 53-53, February.
    4. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2011. "A characterization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(4), pages 691-696, November.
    5. Ephraim Zehavi & Amir Leshem, 2018. "On the Allocation of Multiple Divisible Assets to Players with Different Utilities," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(1), pages 253-274, June.
    6. Li, Xiangliang, 2023. "Bargaining: Nash, Consensus, or Compromise?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 730-742.
    7. Bram Driesen & Peter Eccles & Nora Wegner, 2017. "A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1115-1135, November.

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