IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormsom/v21y2019i2p398-416.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Contract Design for the Stockist in Indian Distribution Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Ananth Iyer

    (Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907;)

  • Omkar Palsule-Desai

    (Indian Institute of Management, Indore, Madhya Pradesh 453 331, India)

Abstract

Problem definition : Stockists are the entity in the supply chain who deliver to the millions of small shops that account for over 90% of retail sales in India. The stockist purchases product from the manufacturer, develops retailer interest in carrying the product, solves the logistics problem of delivery to retailers, and manages retail credit and money collection. In return, the stockist is provided assistance by the manufacturer and paid an associated margin that is a percent of the product’s retail price. We observed relatively low distribution margins offered to the stockists in India that was a surprise given infrastructure and financing challenges. We noted that the low margins are enabled by the efficiency in product delivery and demand stimulation induced by the stockist. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of screening contracts offered by manufacturers to stockists. Methodology : We use a principal–agent model structure and model the routing cost, inventory cost, and demand impact of the stockist’s capability. We then use a substitutes or complements relationship between manufacturer assistance and stockist impact to understand the optimal contract structure—i.e., level of assistance and associated retail margin. We describe the economics associated with the stockist, provide data regarding the margins and assistance provided by the manufacturer, and use the model to understand their use in developing an effective supply chain. Results : Our model uses three parameters to show that a manufacture can adjust the level of spatial retailer intensity and thus the impact of the stockist in generating demand, the fraction of high-performing stockists associated with the manufacturer and the nature of the relationship between assistance provided and its impact on the stockist’s performance (i.e., complements or substitutes relationship), to attain superior performance. Academic/practical relevance : We parameterize data from Indian firms in the consumer goods industry to understand the observed assistance provided by the manufacturer to the stockist, and associated margins. We then use our model to understand actions taken by a manufacturer in the Indian market. Managerial implications : Our analysis provides a framework for manufacturers to design screening contracts for stockists who play a vital role in managing the fragmented retail markets in developing countries. The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2018.0722 . This paper has been accepted for the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Special Issue on Value Chain Innovations in Developing Economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Ananth Iyer & Omkar Palsule-Desai, 2019. "Contract Design for the Stockist in Indian Distribution Networks," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 21(2), pages 398-416, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:21:y:2019:i:2:p:398-416
    DOI: 10.1287/msom.2018.0722
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2018.0722
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/msom.2018.0722?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles J. Corbett, 2001. "Stochastic Inventory Systems in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information: Cycle Stocks, Safety Stocks, and Consignment Stock," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 49(4), pages 487-500, August.
    2. Zhengping Wu & Wanshan Zhu & Pascale Crama, 2011. "The Newsvendor Problem with Advertising Revenue," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 13(3), pages 281-296, July.
    3. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    4. Sang-Hyun Kim & Serguei Netessine, 2013. "Collaborative Cost Reduction and Component Procurement Under Information Asymmetry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(1), pages 189-206, November.
    5. M. Haimovich & A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, 1985. "Bounds and Heuristics for Capacitated Routing Problems," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 527-542, November.
    6. Aadhaar Chaturvedi & Victor Martínez-de-Albéniz, 2011. "Optimal Procurement Design in the Presence of Supply Risk," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 13(2), pages 227-243, May.
    7. Ananth V. Iyer & Leroy B. Schwarz & Stefanos A. Zenios, 2005. "A Principal-Agent Model for Product Specification and Production," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(1), pages 106-119, January.
    8. Albert Y. Ha, 2001. "Supplier‐buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(1), pages 41-64, February.
    9. Charles J. Corbett & Xavier de Groote, 2000. "A Supplier's Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(3), pages 444-450, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fransoo, Jan C. & Escamilla, Rafael & Ge, Jiwen, 2024. "Nanoretail operations in developing markets," Other publications TiSEM 11ea94fa-87eb-41ca-89f6-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Rafael Escamilla & Jan C. Fransoo & Christopher S. Tang, 2021. "Improving Agility, Adaptability, Alignment, Accessibility, and Affordability in Nanostore Supply Chains," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(3), pages 676-688, March.
    3. Adhikari, Arnab & Bisi, Arnab, 2020. "Collaboration, bargaining, and fairness concern for a green apparel supply chain: An emerging economy perspective," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    4. Mark Brennan & Stephen Graves & Jonars Spielberg & Bish Sanyal, 2022. "Operations, risk, and small firms: Field results from irrigation equipment vendors in Senegal," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(9), pages 3594-3610, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Amiya K. Chakravarty & Jun Zhang, 2007. "Collaboration in contingent capacities with information asymmetry," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(4), pages 421-432, June.
    2. Yong Zha & Kehong Chen & Xiaohang Yue & Yugang Yu & Samar Mukhopadhyay, 2019. "Trade credit contract in the presence of retailer investment opportunity," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(4), pages 283-296, June.
    3. Guoming Lai & Yixuan Liu & Wenqiang Xiao, 2021. "International Taxation and Production Outsourcing," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(2), pages 402-418, February.
    4. Dimitris Zissis & George Ioannou & Apostolos Burnetas, 2020. "Coordinating Lot Sizing Decisions Under Bilateral Information Asymmetry," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(2), pages 371-387, February.
    5. Xin Yun & Hao Liu & Yi Li & Kin Keung Lai, 2023. "Contract design under asymmetric demand information for sustainable supply chain practices," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 324(1), pages 1429-1459, May.
    6. İsmail Bakal & Nesim Erkip & Refik Güllü, 2011. "Value of supplier’s capacity information in a two-echelon supply chain," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 115-135, November.
    7. Leon Yang Chu & Noam Shamir & Hyoduk Shin, 2017. "Strategic Communication for Capacity Alignment with Pricing in a Supply Chain," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(12), pages 4366-4377, December.
    8. Erica L. Plambeck & Terry A. Taylor, 2007. "Implications of Renegotiation for Optimal Contract Flexibility and Investment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(12), pages 1872-1886, December.
    9. Roemer, Nils & Müller, Sven & Voigt, Guido, 2023. "A choice-based optimization approach for contracting in supply chains," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(1), pages 271-286.
    10. Alfonso J. Pedraza-Martinez & Sameer Hasija & Luk N. Van Wassenhove, 2020. "Fleet Coordination in Decentralized Humanitarian Operations Funded by Earmarked Donations," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 984-999, July.
    11. Alibeiki, Hedayat & Gümüş, Mehmet, 2020. "Supply competition under quality scores: Motivations, information sharing and credibility," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    12. Holly Lutze & Özalp Özer, 2008. "Promised Lead-Time Contracts Under Asymmetric Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 56(4), pages 898-915, August.
    13. Ehsan Bolandifar & Tianjun Feng & Fuqiang Zhang, 2018. "Simple Contracts to Assure Supply Under Noncontractible Capacity and Asymmetric Cost Information," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 20(2), pages 217-231, May.
    14. Wenbo Cai & Ying-Ju Chen, 2017. "Channel management and product design with consumers’ probabilistic choices," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(3), pages 904-923, February.
    15. Lv, Fei & Xiao, Lei & Xu, Minghui & Guan, Xu, 2019. "Quantity-payment versus two-part tariff contracts in an assembly system with asymmetric cost information," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 60-80.
    16. Chernonog, Tatyana & Avinadav, Tal, 2019. "Pricing and advertising in a supply chain of perishable products under asymmetric information," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 249-264.
    17. Hao Zhang & Mahesh Nagarajan & Greys Sošić, 2010. "Dynamic Supplier Contracts Under Asymmetric Inventory Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 58(5), pages 1380-1397, October.
    18. Lusheng Shao & Xiaole Wu & Fuqiang Zhang, 2020. "Sourcing Competition under Cost Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(2), pages 447-461, February.
    19. Babich, Volodymyr & Li, Hantao & Ritchken, Peter & Wang, Yunzeng, 2012. "Contracting with asymmetric demand information in supply chains," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 217(2), pages 333-341.
    20. Sri Vanamalla Venkataraman & Dereje Asfaw, 2020. "Buyback contract under asymmetric information about retailer’s loss aversion nature," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 295(1), pages 385-409, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:21:y:2019:i:2:p:398-416. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.