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Quitting Games and Linear Complementarity Problems

Author

Listed:
  • Eilon Solan

    (School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997800, Israel)

  • Omri N. Solan

    (School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997800, Israel)

Abstract

We prove that every multiplayer quitting game admits a sunspot ε -equilibrium for every ε >0, that is, an ε -equilibrium in an extended game in which the players observe a public signal at every stage. We also prove that, if a certain matrix that is derived from the payoffs in the game is not a Q -matrix in the sense of linear complementarity problems, then the game admits a uniform ε -equilibrium for every ε >0.

Suggested Citation

  • Eilon Solan & Omri N. Solan, 2020. "Quitting Games and Linear Complementarity Problems," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(2), pages 434-454, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:45:y:2020:i:2:p:434-454
    DOI: 10.1287/moor.2019.0996
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, 2014. "Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 89-135, February.
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    5. Eilon Solan & Nicholas Vieille, 2001. "Quitting Games - An Example," Discussion Papers 1314, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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    12. Robert Samuel Simon, 2012. "A Topological Approach to Quitting Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 37(1), pages 180-195, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eilon Solan & Omri N. Solan, 2021. "Sunspot equilibrium in positive recursive general quitting games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 891-909, December.

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