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Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study

Author

Listed:
  • Neil Newman

    (Department of Computer Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada)

  • Kevin Leyton-Brown

    (Department of Computer Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada)

  • Paul Milgrom

    (Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305)

  • Ilya Segal

    (Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305)

Abstract

This paper revisits the descending clock “reverse” auction design used in the U.S. Federal Communications Commission’s 2016–2017 “incentive auction.” We use extensive computational simulations to investigate the quantitative significance of various aspects of the design, leveraging a reverse auction simulator and realistic models of bidder values.

Suggested Citation

  • Neil Newman & Kevin Leyton-Brown & Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2024. "Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(11), pages 8187-8215, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:70:y:2024:i:11:p:8187-8215
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.02489
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