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Task Complexity, Equilibrium Selection, and Learning: An Experimental Study

Author

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  • Teck-Hua Ho

    (Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095)

  • Keith Weigelt

    (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104)

Abstract

We consider several coordination games with multiple equilibria each of which is a different division of a fixed pie. Laboratory experiments are conducted to address whether "task complexity" affects the selection of equilibrium by subjects. Three measures of task complexity---cardinality of choice space, level of iterative knowledge of rationality, and level of iterative knowledge of strategy---are manipulated and tested. Results suggest the three measures can predict choice behavior. Since strategically equivalent games can have different task complexity measures, our results imply that subjects are sensitive to game form presentation. We also fit data using three adaptive learning models: 1) Cournot, 2) Fictitious Play, and 3) Payoff Reinforcement, in increasing order of required cognitive effort. The Fictitious Play model, which tracks only cumulative frequencies of opponents' past behaviors fits the data best.

Suggested Citation

  • Teck-Hua Ho & Keith Weigelt, 1996. "Task Complexity, Equilibrium Selection, and Learning: An Experimental Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(5), pages 659-679, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:42:y:1996:i:5:p:659-679
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.42.5.659
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    Cited by:

    1. Aradhna Krishna & M. Utku Ünver, 2008. "Research Note—Improving the Efficiency of Course Bidding at Business Schools: Field and Laboratory Studies," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(2), pages 262-282, 03-04.
    2. Bosch-Domènech, Antoni & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2013. "On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 52-67.
    3. Yu Wang & Aradhna Krishna, 2006. "Timeshare Exchange Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(8), pages 1223-1237, August.
    4. C.Mónica Capra & Tomomi Tanaka & ColinF. Camerer & Lauren Feiler & Veronica Sovero & CharlesN. Noussair, 2009. "The Impact of Simple Institutions in Experimental Economies with Poverty Traps," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 977-1009, July.
    5. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1193-1235, September.
    6. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua, 2015. "Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    7. Reina, Livia, 2003. "Negotiators' cognition: An experimental study on bilateral, integrative negotiation," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 05/03, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    8. McKinney, C. Nicholas & Van Huyck, John B., 2013. "Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 223-232.
    9. Shafran, Aric P., 2012. "Learning in games with risky payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 354-371.
    10. Helland, Leif & Iachan, Felipe S. & Juelsrud, Ragnar E. & Nenov, Plamen T., 2021. "Information quality and regime change: Evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 538-554.
    11. Tse, Alan & Friesen, Lana & Kalaycı, Kenan, 2016. "Complexity and asset legitimacy in retirement investment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 35-48.
    12. Luhan, Wolfgang J. & Poulsen, Anders U. & Roos, Michael W.M., 2017. "Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 687-699.
    13. Hwang, Joon Ho & Kim, Min-Su, 2015. "Misunderstanding of the binomial distribution, market inefficiency, and learning behavior: Evidence from an exotic sports betting market," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 243(1), pages 333-344.
    14. López-Pérez, Raúl & Pintér, Ágnes & Kiss, Hubert J., 2015. "Does payoff equity facilitate coordination? A test of Schelling's conjecture," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 209-222.
    15. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco & Reina, Livia, 2003. "Coalition formation in multilateral negotiations with a potential for logrolling: An experimental analysis of negotiators' cognition processes," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 17/03, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    16. William Schmidt & Ryan W. Buell, 2017. "Experimental Evidence of Pooling Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(5), pages 1586-1605, May.
    17. Wilfred Amaldoss & Sanjay Jain, 2002. "David vs. Goliath: An Analysis of Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(8), pages 972-991, August.
    18. Elie Ofek & Muhamet Yildiz & Ernan Haruvy, 2007. "The Impact of Prior Decisions on Subsequent Valuations in a Costly Contemplation Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(8), pages 1217-1233, August.
    19. Christina Fang & Sari Carp & Zur Shapira, 2011. "Prior Divergence: Do Researchers and Participants Share the Same Prior Probability Distributions?," Discussion Paper Series dp587, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    20. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2019. "Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-12.
    21. Teck-Hua Ho & Keith Weigelt, 2005. "Trust Building Among Strangers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(4), pages 519-530, April.
    22. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin Kuan Chong, 2003. "A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics.
    23. Chen, Yan & Khoroshilov, Yuri, 2003. "Learning under limited information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-25, July.
    24. Teck H. Ho & Xin Wang & Colin F. Camerer, 2008. "Individual Differences in EWA Learning with Partial Payoff Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 37-59, January.
    25. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898.

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