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A Software Package and Data Set for the Personal Protective Equipment Matching Problem During COVID-19

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  • Michele Samorani

    (Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California 95053)

  • Ram Bala

    (Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California 95053)

  • Rohit Jacob

    (Project Stanley Inc., Pleasanton, California 94566)

  • Shuhan He

    (Massachusetts General Hospital, Department of Emergency Medicine, Boston, Massachusetts 02114; Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts 02115)

Abstract

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Get Us PPE provided a platform aimed at connecting prospective donors of personal protective equipment (PPE) to prospective recipients of PPE. Requests by donors and recipients were collected over time, and periodically, the PPE matching problem was solved in order to instruct each donor to ship a certain quantity of PPE to a given recipient. The objectives of the PPE matching problem include maximizing the recipients’ fill rate, minimizing the total shipping distance, minimizing the holding time of PPE, and minimizing the number of shipments of each donor. This paper presents a software framework to facilitate the development of methodologies to solve the PPE matching problem and their testing on a real-world data set collected by Get Us PPE during the COVID-19 pandemic. Both software and data set are available on GitHub.

Suggested Citation

  • Michele Samorani & Ram Bala & Rohit Jacob & Shuhan He, 2022. "A Software Package and Data Set for the Personal Protective Equipment Matching Problem During COVID-19," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 34(5), pages 2754-2761, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:orijoc:v:34:y:2022:i:5:p:2754-2761
    DOI: 10.1287/ijoc.2022.1203
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1997. "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 284-329, April.
    2. Lester Blackmon & Ross Chan & Omar Carbral & Geeta Chintapally & Sandip Dhara & Peter Felix & Aditi Jagdish & Srini Konakalla & Jasbir Labana & Jeff McIlvain & Jason Stone & Christopher S. Tang & Jaso, 2021. "Rapid Development of a Decision Support System to Alleviate Food Insecurity at the Los Angeles Regional Food Bank amid the COVID‐19 Pandemic," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(10), pages 3391-3407, October.
    3. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
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