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Equilibrium Notions for Agents with Cumulative Prospect Theory Preferences

Author

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  • Kerim Keskin

    (School of Business, ADA University, Baku AZ1008, Azerbaijan)

Abstract

Relying on the experimental findings that actual choice behavior often violates the axioms of expected utility theory (EUT), we study non-EUT preferences in a noncooperative game-theoretic framework. In particular, agents’ preferences are represented by the pair of functions suggested in cumulative prospect theory (CPT). Accordingly, three key aspects of CPT are incorporated: subjective probability weighting, loss aversion, and reference dependence. We introduce a correlated equilibrium and two mixed strategy equilibria for agents with CPT preferences. We prove the existence of equilibria for finite normal form games and investigate the sets of equilibria in some examples.

Suggested Citation

  • Kerim Keskin, 2016. "Equilibrium Notions for Agents with Cumulative Prospect Theory Preferences," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 13(3), pages 192-208, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:13:y:2016:i:3:p:192-208
    DOI: 10.1287/deca.2016.0333
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Soham R. Phade & Venkat Anantharam, 2020. "Black-Box Strategies and Equilibrium for Games with Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Players," Papers 2004.09592, arXiv.org.
    2. Theodore T. Allen & Olivia K. Hernand & Abdullah Alomair, 2020. "Optimal Off-line Experimentation for Games," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 17(4), pages 277-298, December.
    3. Keskin, Kerim, 2018. "Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 85-91.
    4. Fu, Qiang & Lyu, Youji & Wu, Zenan & Zhang, Yuanjie, 2022. "Expectations-based loss aversion in contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 1-27.
    5. Vincent Laferrière & David Staubli & Christian Thöni, 2023. "Explaining Excess Entry in Winner-Take-All Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 1050-1069, February.
    6. Ali Yekkehkhany & Timothy Murray & Rakesh Nagi, 2021. "Stochastic Superiority Equilibrium in Game Theory," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 18(2), pages 153-168, June.
    7. Soham R. Phade & Venkat Anantharam, 2019. "On the Geometry of Nash and Correlated Equilibria with Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Preferences," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 16(2), pages 142-156, June.
    8. Soham R. Phade & Venkat Anantharam, 2023. "Learning in Games with Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Preferences," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 265-306, March.
    9. Metzger, Lars Peter & Rieger, Marc Oliver, 2019. "Non-cooperative games with prospect theory players and dominated strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 396-409.

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