Permanent Effects Of Temporary Fraud In Transition Economies: The Role Of Honesty, Price, And Limited Information Flows
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More about this item
Keywords
Transition; Fraud; Indentification; Reputation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
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