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Macroprodential Policy under Uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Saleem Bahaj

    (Bank of England and Centre for Macroeconomics)

  • Angus Foulis

    (Bank of England and Centre for Macroeconomics)

Abstract

We argue that uncertainty over the impact of macroprudential policy need not make a policymaker more cautious. Our starting point is the classic finding of Brainard that uncertainty over the impact of a policy instrument will make a policymaker less active. This result is challenged in a series of richer models designed to take into account the more complex reality faced by a macroprudential policymaker. We find that asymmetries in policy objectives, the presence of unquantifiable sources of risk, the ability to learn from policy, and private-sector uncertainty over policy objectives can all lead to more active policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Saleem Bahaj & Angus Foulis, 2017. "Macroprodential Policy under Uncertainty," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(3), pages 119-154, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2017:q:3:a:4
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    Cited by:

    1. Górajski, Mariusz & Kuchta, Zbigniew, 2023. "Coordination and non-coordination risks of monetary and macroprudential authorities: A robust welfare analysis," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    2. Tihana Škrinjarić, 2023. "Credit-to-GDP Gap Estimates in Real Time: A Stable Indicator for Macroprudential Policy Making in Croatia," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 65(3), pages 582-614, September.
    3. Pervin Dadashova & Magnus Jonsson, 2019. "Mitigating the Cost of Stricter Macroprudential Policies," Working Papers 02/2019, National Bank of Ukraine.
    4. Punzi, Maria Teresa, 2020. "The impact of uncertainty on the macro-financial linkage with international financial exposure," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    5. Buckmann, Marcus & Gallego Marquez, Paula & Gimpelewicz, Mariana & Kapadia, Sujit & Rismanchi, Katie, 2021. "The more the merrier? Evidence from the global financial crisis on the value of multiple requirements in bank regulation," Bank of England working papers 905, Bank of England.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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