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Optimal Monetary Policy in Response to Cost-Push Shocks: The Impact of Central Bank Communication

Author

Listed:
  • Romain Baeriswyl

    (Munich Graduate School of Economics and Swiss National Bank)

  • Camille Cornand

    (BETA CNRS–University of Strasbourg)

Abstract

This paper argues that a central bank’s optimal policy in response to a cost-push shock depends upon its disclosure regime. More precisely, a credible central bank may find it optimal to implement an accommodative monetary policy in response to a positive cost-push shock whenever the uncertainty surrounding its monetary instrument is high. Indeed, the degree of the central bank’s transparency influences the effectiveness of its policy to stabilize inflation in terms of output gap. The effectiveness, in turn, determines whether it will implement an expansionary or contractionary policy in response to a positive cost-push shock.

Suggested Citation

  • Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2010. "Optimal Monetary Policy in Response to Cost-Push Shocks: The Impact of Central Bank Communication," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 6(2), pages 31-52, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2010:q:2:a:2
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Isabelle SALLE & Marc-Alexandre SENEGAS & Murat YILDIZOGLU, 2013. "How Transparent About Its Inflation Target Should a Central Bank be? An Agent-Based Model Assessment," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2013-24, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
    2. Benchimol, Jonathan, 2024. "Central bank objectives, monetary policy rules, and limited information," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    3. Salle, Isabelle & Yıldızoğlu, Murat & Sénégas, Marc-Alexandre, 2013. "Inflation targeting in a learning economy: An ABM perspective," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 114-128.
    4. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
    5. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination," NBER Working Papers 22297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Anna Agliari & Domenico Massaro & Nicolò Pecora & Alessandro Spelta, 2017. "Inflation Targeting, Recursive Inattentiveness, and Heterogeneous Beliefs," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(7), pages 1587-1619, October.
    7. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1umfa09lat09b1bg is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1umfa09lat09b1bg is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1umfa09lat09b1bg is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Paul Hubert, 2010. "Monetary policy, imperfect information and the expectations channel [Politique monétaire,information imparfaite et canal des anticipations]," SciencePo Working papers Main tel-04095385, HAL.
    11. Salle, Isabelle L., 2015. "Modeling expectations in agent-based models — An application to central bank's communication and monetary policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 130-141.
    12. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1umfa09lat09b1bg is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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