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Does the Concept of Property Rights Hold Relevance for Human Resource Performance?: An Applied Study of Privatized Companies in Tunisia

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  • Fakhri Issaoui

    (King Khalid University, Saudi Arabia)

  • Zaher Meshari Abderrahim

    (King Khalid University, Saudi Arabia)

  • Majed Bin Othayman

    (King Khalid University, Saudi Arabia)

  • Slah Slimani

    (King Khalid University, Saudi Arabia)

Abstract

In a world where information technologies (ITs) are globalizing and acting directly and explicitly on organizations, the question of property rights neutrality becomes strategic. In this study, the authors investigated whether ownership is a determinant of human resource performance or whether it is driven by factors other than ownership (e.g., technology and IT). Thus, the major objective of this research was to find out under what conditions ownership exerts a nonneutral effect on the performance of human resources and whether these effects are dependent on the technological aspects of organizations. The authors' methodology included two techniques, namely, nonparametric tests applied to the main indicators of 21 privatized companies (operating in the IT and other sectors) in the Tunisian case, and panel data to explain the impact of privatizations on human resources. The results showed that the privatization process has allowed an improvement in productivity indicators through an increase in incentive systems, particularly for companies with high technological content. The application of the econometric technique evidenced a whole policy of restructuring the allocation of human resources, in the postprivatization period. This makes sense because the incentive system of newly privatized companies strived to be more efficient. Furthermore, the second model showed that human resource dynamics after privatization depends on the business cycle and the nature of investors and IT. The third model confirmed the idea that privatization leads to an improvement in the workforce and its productivity in the long term. Overall, the study generated important managerial implications, the most important of which is that privatization can only generate a positive effect on human resource performance when employees feel involved in the process and as much as the organization is involved in new ITs.

Suggested Citation

  • Fakhri Issaoui & Zaher Meshari Abderrahim & Majed Bin Othayman & Slah Slimani, 2024. "Does the Concept of Property Rights Hold Relevance for Human Resource Performance?: An Applied Study of Privatized Companies in Tunisia," International Journal of Human Capital and Information Technology Professionals (IJHCITP), IGI Global, vol. 15(1), pages 1-25, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:igg:jhcitp:v:15:y:2024:i:1:p:1-25
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Pollution permits and environmental innovation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 127-140, October.
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