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A Stackelberg Model Of Child Support And Welfare

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  • Jennifer Roff

Abstract

This article models the child support and welfare decisions of never-married parents on welfare as a Stackelberg game. The mother chooses whether to exit welfare, report paternity, and to obtain a formal child support order. If a child support order is obtained, the father chooses whether to comply with the order. Simulation results from the structural parameters indicate that increasing the child support disregard increases paternal compliance slightly and affects maternal paternity reporting more significantly; effects are limited, however, by low paternal incomes. Results also indicate that high award amounts can decrease expected child support payments to women on welfare. Copyright ©2008 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Jennifer Roff, 2008. "A Stackelberg Model Of Child Support And Welfare," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(2), pages 515-546, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:49:y:2008:i:2:p:515-546
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    1. Daniel R. Meyer & Mei-Chen Hu, 1999. "A Note on the Antipoverty Effectiveness of Child Support among Mother-Only Families," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(1), pages 225-234.
    2. McFadden, Daniel, 1989. "A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Discrete Response Models without Numerical Integration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 995-1026, September.
    3. Virginia W. Knox, 1996. "The Effects of Child Support Payments on Developmental Outcomes for Elementary School-Age Children," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 31(4), pages 816-840.
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    5. Del Boca, Daniela & Flinn, Christopher J, 1995. "Rationalizing Child-Support Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1241-1262, December.
    6. Flinn, Christopher J, 2000. "Modes of Interaction between Divorced Parents," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(3), pages 545-578, August.
    7. Laurie J. Bassi & Robert I. Lerman, 1996. "Reducing the child support welfare disincentive problem," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(1), pages 89-96.
    8. Daniel Meyer, 1993. "Child support and welfare dynamics: Evidence from Wisconsin," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 30(1), pages 45-62, February.
    9. Maureen R Waller & Robert Plotnick, 2001. "Effective child support policy for low-income families: evidence from street level research," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 89-110.
    10. Maureen A. Pirog-Good & David H. Good, 1995. "Child support enforcement for teenage fathers: Problems and prospects," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(1), pages 25-42.
    11. repec:bla:revinw:v:43:y:1997:i:3:p:261-81 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Cynthia Miller & Irwin Garfinkel & Sara McLanahan, 1997. "Child Support In The U.S.: Can Fathers Afford To Pay More?," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 43(3), pages 261-281, September.
    13. Anu Rangarajan & Philip Gleason, 1998. "Young unwed fathers of afdc children: do they provide support?," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 35(2), pages 175-186, May.
    14. Wei-Yin Hu, 1999. "Child Support, Welfare Dependency, and Women's Labor Supply," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(1), pages 71-103.
    15. Robins, Philip K, 1986. "Child Support, Welfare Dependency, and Poverty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 768-788, September.
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    1. Single mothers and Stackelberg games
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2008-08-29 21:01:00

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    1. repec:pri:crcwel:wp10-15-ff is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Urvi Neelakantan, 2009. "The impact of changes in child support policy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 22(3), pages 641-663, July.
    3. Roff, Jennifer & Lugo-Gil, Julieta, 2012. "A model of child support and the underground economy," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 668-681.
    4. Francesconi, Marco & Rainer, Helmut & van der Klaauw, Wilbert, 2008. "Unintended Consequences of Welfare Reform: The Case of Divorced Parents," IZA Discussion Papers 3891, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Terry-Ann L. Craigie, 2010. "Child Support Transfers under Family Complexity," Working Papers 1276, Princeton University, School of Public and International Affairs, Center for Research on Child Wellbeing..
    6. Samara Gunter, 2013. "Effects of child support pass-through and disregard policies on in-kind child support," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 193-209, June.
    7. Brandeanna Allen & John Nunley & Alan Seals, 2011. "The Effect of Joint-Child-Custody Legislation on the Child-Support Receipt of Single Mothers," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 124-139, March.

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