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Anxiety And Performance: An Endogenous Learning-By-Doing Model

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  • Michael T. Rauh
  • Giulio Seccia

Abstract

In this article, we show that a standard economic model, the endogenous learning-by-doing model, captures several major themes from the anxiety literature in psychology. In our model, anxiety is a fully endogenous construct that can be separated naturally into its cognitive and physiological components. As such, our results are directly comparable with hypotheses and evidence from psychology. We show that anxiety can serve a motivating function, which suggests potential applications in the principal-agent literature. Copyright 2006 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael T. Rauh & Giulio Seccia, 2006. "Anxiety And Performance: An Endogenous Learning-By-Doing Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(2), pages 583-609, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:47:y:2006:i:2:p:583-609
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    2. Sanford J. Grossman & Richard E. Kihlstrom & Leonard J. Mirman, 1977. "A Bayesian Approach to the Production of Information and Learning By Doing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 533-547.
    3. Loewenstein, George, 1987. "Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 666-684, September.
    4. Mirman, Leonard J & Samuelson, Larry & Urbano, Amparo, 1993. "Monopoly Experimentation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 549-563, August.
    5. Rauh, Michael T. & Seccia, Giulio, 2005. "Experimentation, full revelation, and the monotone likelihood ratio property," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 239-262, February.
    6. Prescott, Edward C, 1972. "The Multi-Period Control Problem Under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(6), pages 1043-1058, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rick Harbaugh, 2005. "Prospect Theory or Skill Signaling?," Working Papers 2005-06, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    2. Jose Apesteguia & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2010. "Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2548-2564, December.
    3. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2022. "Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 833-882, September.
    4. Michael T. Rauh & Giulio Seccia, 2010. "Agency and Anxiety," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 87-116, March.
      • Michael T. Rauh & Giulio Seccia, 2006. "Agency and Anxiety," Working Papers 2006-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    5. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg & Alec Smith, 2015. "Frustration and Anger in Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 5258, CESifo.
    6. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Roberto Corrao & Martin Dufwenberg, 2019. "Incorporating Belief-Dependent Motivation in Games Abstract:Psychological game theory (PGT), introduced by Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti (1989) and significantly generalized by Battigalli & Dufwenb," Working Papers 642, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    7. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Corrao, Roberto & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2019. "Incorporating belief-dependent motivation in games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 185-218.
    8. Michael T. Rauh & Giulio Seccia, 2005. "Incentives, Monitoring, and Motivation," Game Theory and Information 0506008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin & Smith, Alec, 2019. "Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 15-39.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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