IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ier/iecrev/v40y1999i3p785-800.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Transferable Licenses versus Nontransferable Licenses: What Is the Difference?

Author

Listed:
  • Krishna, Kala
  • Tan, Ling Hui

Abstract

This paper questions the presumption that transferable licenses are worth more and result in higher welfare. We show that the price of a transferable license may be lower than that of its nontransferable counterpart if the underlying quota is not very severe. However, transferability is preferable to nontransferability if consumer surplus and license revenue have equal weight in the welfare function. We also examine whether licenses will be monopolized by domestic producers with market power. The models have implications for several issues, including the design of pollution permits and how to maximize revenue from ticket sales. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Krishna, Kala & Tan, Ling Hui, 1999. "Transferable Licenses versus Nontransferable Licenses: What Is the Difference?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(3), pages 785-800, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:40:y:1999:i:3:p:785-800
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Doda, Baran & Quemin, Simon & Taschini, Luca, 2019. "Linking permit markets multilaterally," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    2. Akira Maeda, 2012. "Setting trigger price in emissions permit markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 358-379, June.
    3. Krishna Kala M & Tan Ling Hui & Ranjan Ram, 2004. "Quantity Controls, License Transferability, and the Level of Investment," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-27, July.
    4. Martin L. Weitzman & Bjart Holtsmark, 2018. "On the effects of linking voluntary cap-and-trade systems for CO2 emissions," Discussion Papers 883, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    5. Akira Maeda, 2004. "Impact of banking and forward contracts on tradable permit markets," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 6(2), pages 81-102, June.
    6. Junji Xiao & Xiaolan Zhou & Wei‐Min Hu, 2017. "Welfare Analysis Of The Vehicle Quota System In China," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 617-650, May.
    7. Akira Maeda, 2004. "Impact of banking and forward contracts on tradable permit markets," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 6(2), pages 81-102, June.
    8. Ling Hui Tan, 2003. "Rationing Rules and Outcomes: The Experience of Singapore's Vehicle Quota System," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 50(3), pages 1-5.
    9. Helm, Carsten, 2003. "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2737-2747, December.
    10. Janda, Karel, 2009. "Signaling the Strength of a Market Entrant," MPRA Paper 17007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Bjart Holtsmark & Martin L. Weitzman, 2020. "On the Effects of Linking Cap-and-Trade Systems for $$\hbox {CO}_{2}$$CO2 Emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 75(3), pages 615-630, March.
    12. Bivins, Laura L. & Krishna, Kala, 2003. "Transferability of migration licences and the distribution of potential rents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 323-328, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:40:y:1999:i:3:p:785-800. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deupaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.