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Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices under Private Information

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  • Trejos, Alberto

Abstract

This paper presents a model of money and search where bargaining determines prices and the quality of goods is private information. It studies how a lemons problem affects the purchasing power of money. There are multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. The superior equilibrium, where no lemons are produced, exists even if information about quality is relatively scarce. In other equilibria, there is price dispersion, and uninformed buyers pay higher prices than informed buyers for all goods. Taxing money balances (a proxy for inflation) makes buyers less selective, thus reducing the average quality of supply and the premium paid for known quality. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Trejos, Alberto, 1999. "Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices under Private Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(3), pages 679-695, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:40:y:1999:i:3:p:679-95
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    Cited by:

    1. Manolis Galenianos & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula & Nicola Persico, 2012. "A Search-Theoretic Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(3), pages 1239-1269.
    2. Wang, Zijian, 2020. "Liquidity and private information in asset markets: To signal or not to signal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    3. Benjamin Lester & Andrew Postlewaite & Randall Wright, 2011. "Information and Liquidity," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(s2), pages 355-377, October.
    4. Benjamin Lester & Andrew Postlewaite & Randall Wright, 2008. "Information, Liquidity and Asset Prices," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-039, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    5. Berentsen, Aleksander & McBride, Michael & Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2017. "Limelight on dark markets: Theory and experimental evidence on liquidity and information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 70-90.
    6. Aleksander Berentsen & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2002. "Money in Bilateral Trade," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 138(IV), pages 489-506, December.
    7. Bignon, Vincent & Dutu, Richard, 2017. "Coin Assaying And Commodity Money," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(6), pages 1305-1335, September.
    8. Williamson, Stephen & Wright, Randall, 2010. "New Monetarist Economics: Models," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 2, pages 25-96, Elsevier.
    9. Allan Hernández, 2008. "Los modelos del dinero endógeno: la evolución de los modelos monetarios de búsqueda," Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, November.
    10. Bajaj, Ayushi, 2018. "Undefeated equilibria of the Shi–Trejos–Wright model under adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 957-986.
    11. Allan Hernandez-Chanto, 2020. "The extrinsic value of low-denomination money holdings," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 263-280, October.
    12. Aleksander Berentsen & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2004. "Money and Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(4), pages 915-944.
    13. Leong, Kaiwen & Li, Huailu & Xu, Haibo, 2018. "Exploiting the Unbanked: Evidence from Singapore's Unlicensed Moneylending Market," IZA Discussion Papers 11786, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Tao Peng, 2017. "Money And Product Quality Under Asymmetric Information," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(3), pages 1388-1399, July.
    15. Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2011. "Payments and liquidity under adverse selection," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 191-205.
    16. Shao Enchuan, 2009. "Money and Barter under Private Information," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-38, February.
    17. Jun Zhang & Haibin Wu, 2004. "Money, Technology Choice and Pattern of Exchange in Search Equilibrium," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 212, Econometric Society.

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