Location of response facilities: a simultaneous game between state and terrorist
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- Kjell Hausken & Vicki M. Bier & Jun Zhuang, 2009. "Defending Against Terrorism, Natural Disaster, and All Hazards," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Vicki M. M. Bier & M. Naceur Azaiez (ed.), Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats, chapter 4, pages 65-97, Springer.
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- Opher Baron & Oded Berman & Arieh Gavious, 2018. "A Game Between a Terrorist and a Passive Defender," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 27(3), pages 433-457, March.
- Nikoofal, Mohammad E. & Zhuang, Jun, 2015. "On the value of exposure and secrecy of defense system: First-mover advantage vs. robustness," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 246(1), pages 320-330.
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Keywords
facilities location; terrorists; game theory; simultaneous moves; simultaneous games; terrorism; response facilities; terrorist attacks; network structure; metropolitan areas; USA; United States; support facilities; state facilities.;All these keywords.
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