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The credit crisis and corporate governance: excessive bonuses of TARP banks

Author

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  • Marco G.D. Guidi
  • Reza Kouhy

Abstract

Maximising TARP banks' value to society would require the integration of all stakeholders rights and 'moral debt' (obligations) claims providing justice in protecting and distributing alienable and inalienable rights as well as their associated benefits and costs. For instance, the TARP banks that maximise their value only for an elite group through excessive bonus payments to executives incur 'moral debt' claims from other stakeholders, which will make the firm less valuable to society. This study shows that the unjust redistribution of rights through compulsory layoffs, whilst making excessive executive bonus payments reduces the value of TARP banks to society.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco G.D. Guidi & Reza Kouhy, 2009. "The credit crisis and corporate governance: excessive bonuses of TARP banks," International Journal of Corporate Governance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(4), pages 366-381.
    • Handle: RePEc:ids:ijcgov:v:1:y:2009:i:4:p:366-381
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Segon & Chris Booth, 2015. "Virtue: The Missing Ethics Element in Emotional Intelligence," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 128(4), pages 789-802, June.

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