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The Number Of Financial Regulatory Authorities And Financial Stability: Cross-Country Experiences

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  • Wahyoe Soedarmono
  • Romora Edward Sitorus

Abstract

This paper attempts to provide evidence whether or not the unification of regulatory institutions for different types of financial sector creates challenges for financial stability. From a sample of 91 countries that provide data on the financial unification index and the central bank involvement index, the empirical results reveal that higher financial unification index or the convergence toward a single supervisory institution outside the central bank, in order to control three different sectors (banking, insurance, and securities), is detrimental for financial stability. However, this finding only holds for developed countries, but dissapears for less developed countries. In parallel, the central bank involvement in financial sector supervision has no impact on financial stability in both developed and less developed countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Wahyoe Soedarmono & Romora Edward Sitorus, 2014. "The Number Of Financial Regulatory Authorities And Financial Stability: Cross-Country Experiences," Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Bank Indonesia, vol. 17(1), pages 129-145, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:idn:journl:v:17:y:2014:i:1e:p:129-145
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v17i1.53
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Supervisory Regimes; Financial Sectors; Financial Stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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