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A Primary Research on the Validity of Enterprise Encouraging System Based on the Paradigm of Strategic Ecology Management

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  • Yanling Jia
  • Wei Guo

Abstract

Aiming at the research results put forward by some Chinese scholars who claim that encouraging invalidations exist in Chinese enterprises. This article advances the following opinions. Some certain encouraging factors have no strong relativity with the enterprise performance, which cannot prove that the encouraging invalidation exists in the investigative sample enterprise. The present researches of the relationships between encouragement and enterprise performance are short of the systemic integration to the numerous influencing factors. But in the strategic ecology paradigm, when we design the interior mechanism between encouraging system and its validities, we should use thelatest research results of ecologically behavioral economics for references, especial for analyzing the interior relationships between the enterprise strategy and the validity of the enterprise encouraging system. This article research possesses guiding values for enterprises governing and its further development.

Suggested Citation

  • Yanling Jia & Wei Guo, 2008. "A Primary Research on the Validity of Enterprise Encouraging System Based on the Paradigm of Strategic Ecology Management," Modern Applied Science, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 1(2), pages 1-37, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ibn:masjnl:v:1:y:2008:i:2:p:37
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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