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Research on Principal-agent Problem of Tourism Attractions Development: A Case Study of Kaiping Diaolou

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  • Chunfan Guo
  • Yan Tang

Abstract

The value of Kaiping Diaolou as a world heritage site is gradually paid great attention from the public. Meanwhile, how to protect and develop it better becomes an important issue. From the perspective of principal-agent theory, the mode of “trusteeship of property right” (i.e., reserve the ownership to Diaolou of private owners and hand the business management right of Diaolou to the government for centralized management and operation of Diaolou) , which is adopted in development of tourism resources of Kaiping Diaolou, is studied in this paper. It is deemed that there are complicated principal-agent relationships existing among the owners of Diaolou, tourism development companies and the local government who participate in the tourism resource development of Kaiping Diaolou, such as bilateral principal-agent with single task, principal-agent with multiple tasks, principal-agent with multiple agents and multi-level principal-agent. Moreover, various principal-agent problems may occur in the further development of tourism resources. Finally, on this basis, the research framework for such kind of problems is put forward.

Suggested Citation

  • Chunfan Guo & Yan Tang, 2015. "Research on Principal-agent Problem of Tourism Attractions Development: A Case Study of Kaiping Diaolou," Journal of Sustainable Development, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 8(6), pages 119-119, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibn:jsd123:v:8:y:2015:i:6:p:119
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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