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A Study on the Influence of Institutional Investor Heterogeneity on the Executive Pay Stickiness¡ª¡ªBased on the Perspective of Industrial Factor Intensity

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  • Qitong Yu
  • Shaoyang Fang
  • Jianjun Wang

Abstract

Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012-2016, this paper empirically studies the influence of heterogeneous institutional investors on executive compensation stickiness of listed companies by using the method of multiple regression. The results show that the pay stickiness is very common in the listed companies. The overall institutional investor¡¯s shareholding is promoting the executive compensation stickiness. The empirical results show that the institutional investors are divided into the pressure resistance institutional investors and the pressure sensitive institutional investors, according to whether the institutional investors have the commercial relationship with the listed companies. The empirical results show that they are compared to the pressure. Sensitive institutions, pressure resistance institutional investors can significantly inhibit the stickiness of executive compensation. However, different types of institutional investors have different preferences for the types of listed companies, and the enthusiasm of participating in corporate governance is different, and the pressure resistance institutional investors pay more attention to labor out of social responsibility. The long-term performance of a force intensive enterprise has a significant inhibitory effect on the stickiness of the executive compensation, while the pressure sensitive institutional investors actively manage and supervise the production and operation of the technology intensive enterprises for the consideration of the investment income, which has a restraining effect on the pay stickiness of the technology intensive enterprises.

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  • Qitong Yu & Shaoyang Fang & Jianjun Wang, 2018. "A Study on the Influence of Institutional Investor Heterogeneity on the Executive Pay Stickiness¡ª¡ªBased on the Perspective of Industrial Factor Intensity," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 10(9), pages 168-168, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibn:ijefaa:v:10:y:2018:i:9:p:168
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    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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