IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ibn/assjnl/v18y2022i7p39.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Personality Difference and Strong-Strong Coalition—Experimental Research Based on Punishment Mechanism

Author

Listed:
  • Jun Liu
  • Cuicui Zhu
  • Di Xiang

Abstract

Research on social value orientation divides rational people into three categories- individualist, pro-social, and competitor. This kind of research does not focus on network structure. Network exchange theory emphasizes that power comes from an exclusive structure, but it ignores the personality characteristics of people. This paper combines these two studies to explore how punishment mechanisms affect individual coalition strategies in an exclusive structure. The experimental results prove that- (1) when the strong is not in the coalition, there is no significant difference in the benefits of the strong power individualist person and the strong power pro-social person; (2) when two people with different social value orientations are strong-strong coalition, the two will form a “betrayal chain” whose benefit is close to the equilibrium value of the “compromise chain”. The strong power individualists are more likely to “betray” and “take advantage” more than the strong power pro-socialists; (3) the intensity of punishment is inversely related to the frequency of “betrayer”. Analysis of the dialogue data revealed that (4) the strong will properly take care of the weak, and the weak will “approach” the strong; (5) heavy punishment will have a deterrent effect, allowing the actors, especially pro-social to internalize the “punishment mechanism”. This study incorporates both personality and structure into the model, and such studies can explain many power phenomena.

Suggested Citation

  • Jun Liu & Cuicui Zhu & Di Xiang, 2022. "Personality Difference and Strong-Strong Coalition—Experimental Research Based on Punishment Mechanism," Asian Social Science, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 18(7), pages 1-39, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibn:assjnl:v:18:y:2022:i:7:p:39
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ass/article/download/0/0/47425/50840
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ass/article/view/0/47425
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Makowsky, Michael D. & Wang, Siyu, 2018. "Embezzlement, whistleblowing, and organizational architecture: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 58-75.
    2. Mengyuan Zhou, 2022. "Does the Source of Inheritance Matter in Bequest Attitudes? Evidence from Japan," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 43(4), pages 867-887, December.
    3. Christoph Engel & Michael Kurschilgen, 2011. "Fairness Ex Ante and Ex Post: Experimentally Testing Ex Post Judicial Intervention into Blockbuster Deals," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(4), pages 682-708, December.
    4. Markus C. Arnold & Eva Ponick, 2006. "Kommunikation im Groves-Mechanismus — Ergebnisse eines Laborexperiments," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 89-120, February.
    5. Kamei, Kenju, 2016. "Information Disclosure and Cooperation in a Finitely-repeated Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 75100, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Christian Thöni, 2014. "Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 529-545, April.
    7. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
    8. Gonzalo Olcina & Vicente Calabuig, 2015. "Coordinated Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(2), pages 147-173, April.
    9. Zvonimir Bašić & Parampreet C. Bindra & Daniela Glätzle-Rützler & Angelo Romano & Matthias Sutter & Claudia Zoller, 2021. "The Roots of Cooperation," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 097, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    10. Fangfang Tan, 2008. "Punishment in a Linear Public Good Game with Productivity Heterogeneity," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 269-293, September.
    11. Marco Tomassini & Alberto Antonioni, 2019. "Computational Behavioral Models for Public Goods Games on Social Networks," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-14, September.
    12. Max M Krasnow & Andrew W Delton & Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, 2015. "Group Cooperation without Group Selection: Modest Punishment Can Recruit Much Cooperation," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(4), pages 1-17, April.
    13. Thommes, Kirsten & Vyrastekova, Jana & Akkerman, Agnes, 2015. "Behavioral spillovers from freeriding in multilevel interactions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 78-87.
    14. Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, "undated". "Pro-Social Behavior, Reciprocity or Both?," IEW - Working Papers 107, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    15. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2006. "Environmental Morale and Motivation," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-17, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    16. De Geest, Lawrence R. & Kingsley, David C., 2021. "Norm enforcement with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 403-430.
    17. Arhan Ertan & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2005. "Can Endogenously Chosen Institutions Mitigate the Free-Rider Problem and Reduce Perverse Punishment?," Working Papers 2005-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    18. Karbowski, Adam, 2011. "O kilku modelach samolubnego karania w ekonomii behawioralnej [Evolution of altruism in the light of behavioral economics]," MPRA Paper 69604, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Almeida, Sergio, 2023. "Punishment credibility and cooperation in public good games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 106(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ibn:assjnl:v:18:y:2022:i:7:p:39. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Canadian Center of Science and Education (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cepflch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.