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Expected Effect of Deposit Insurance System Over the State of the Banking Environment of Georgia

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  • Sophio Khundadze

    (International Black Sea University)

Abstract

The problem of weak market discipline, which is argued to be provoked by the implementation of deposit insurance system, is believed to be solved by imposing coverage limit over the insured funds. The paper focuses on the probable effects of deposit insurance system over the banking environment of Georgia through questioning and observing the behavior of Georgian population under deposit insurance system. The results of observation are tested using confirmatory data analysis to show the anticipated effect of the system and its component of coverage limit over the Georgian banking sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Sophio Khundadze, 2010. "Expected Effect of Deposit Insurance System Over the State of the Banking Environment of Georgia," IBSU Scientific Journal, International Black Sea University, vol. 4(2), pages 53-72.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibl:journl:v:4:y:2010:i:2:p:53-72
    as

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    File URL: https://journal.ibsu.edu.ge/index.php/ibsusj/article/download/161/167
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Discount Window Lending and Deposit Insurance," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(1), pages 246-275, January.
    2. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2006. "Deposit insurance design and implementation : policy lessons from research and practice," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3969, The World Bank.
    3. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Karacaovali, Baybars & Laeven, Luc, 2005. "Deposit insurance around the world : a comprehensive database," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3628, The World Bank.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    deposit insurance; coverage limit; market discipline;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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