IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ibf/ijbfre/v7y2013i1p55-68.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

This paper empirically tests the relation between a firm’s degree of accounting conservatism and its level of operating risk. This paper constitutes the first empirical study in the accounting literature to test the risk signaling theory of accounting conservatism which is recently proposed by Wang, O hOgartaigh and van Zijl (2010), who argue that a firm optimally selects a degree of accounting conservatism in order to signal its own operating risk to the capital market. Consistent with the signaling theory, this paper reports empirical evidence that US firms with a lower level of operating risk are more likely to adopt a higher level of accounting conservatism than are firms with a higher level of operating risk. This finding indicates that a signaling separating equilibrium indeed exists in the capital market, where firms use accounting conservatism as a signaling device. The findings of this paper highlights the important economic role that accounting conservatism plays in reducing the capital market’s information asymmetry with regard to the firm’s operating risk

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Zhe Wang

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Zhe Wang, 2013. "This paper empirically tests the relation between a firm’s degree of accounting conservatism and its level of operating risk. This paper constitutes the first empirical study in the accounting liter," The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 7(1), pages 55-68.
  • Handle: RePEc:ibf:ijbfre:v:7:y:2013:i:1:p:55-68
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.theibfr2.com/RePEc/ibf/ijbfre/ijbfr-v7n1-2013/IJBFR-V7N1-2013-5.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ball, Ray & Shivakumar, Lakshmanan, 2005. "Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-128, February.
    2. Mark Grinblatt & Chuan Yang Hwang, "undated". "Signalling and the Pricing of Unseasoned New Issues," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 1-89, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    3. Ray Ball & Lakshmanan Shivakumar, 2006. "The Role of Accruals in Asymmetrically Timely Gain and Loss Recognition," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 207-242, May.
    4. Merton, Robert C, 1974. "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 449-470, May.
    5. Guay, Wayne & Verrecchia, Robert, 2006. "Discussion of an economic framework for conservative accounting and Bushman and Piotroski (2006)," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 149-165, October.
    6. Hamada, Robert S, 1972. "The Effect of the Firm's Capital Structure on the Systematic Risk of Common Stocks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 27(2), pages 435-452, May.
    7. Stephen Ryan, 2006. "Identifying Conditional Conservatism," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 511-525.
    8. Khan, Mozaffar & Watts, Ross L., 2009. "Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2-3), pages 132-150, December.
    9. Basu, Sudipta, 1997. "The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 3-37, December.
    10. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    11. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:2:p:831-868 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Beatty, Anne & Weber, Joseph & Yu, Jeff Jiewei, 2008. "Conservatism and Debt," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 154-174, August.
    13. Frank Gigler & Chandra Kanodia & Haresh Sapra & Raghu Venugopalan, 2009. "Accounting Conservatism and the Efficiency of Debt Contracts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 767-797, June.
    14. Guay, Wayne R., 2008. "Conservative financial reporting, debt covenants, and the agency costs of debt," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 175-180, August.
    15. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    16. Zhang, Jieying, 2008. "The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 27-54, March.
    17. Bushman, Robert M. & Piotroski, Joseph D., 2006. "Financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting: The influence of legal and political institutions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 107-148, October.
    18. repec:bla:jfinan:v:44:y:1989:i:2:p:393-420 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kothari, S.P. & Ramanna, Karthik & Skinner, Douglas J., 2010. "Implications for GAAP from an analysis of positive research in accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 246-286, December.
    2. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
    3. Jagadison K. Aier & Long Chen & Mikhail Pevzner, 2014. "Debtholders’ Demand for Conservatism: Evidence from Changes in Directors’ Fiduciary Duties," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(5), pages 993-1027, December.
    4. Richard Barker & Anne McGeachin, 2015. "An Analysis of Concepts and Evidence on the Question of Whether IFRS Should be Conservative," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 51(2), pages 169-207, June.
    5. Yuying Xie, 2015. "Confusion over Accounting Conservatism: A Critical Review," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 25(2), pages 204-216, June.
    6. Inder K. Khurana & Changjiang Wang, 2015. "Debt Maturity Structure and Accounting Conservatism," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1-2), pages 167-203, January.
    7. Takuya Iwasaki & Shota Otomasa & Atsushi Shiiba & Akinobu Shuto, 2012. "The role of accounting conservatism in executive compensation contracts (Forthcoming in Journal of Business Finance and Accounting)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-370, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Jul 2018.
    8. Ettredge, Michael & Huang, Ying & Zhang, Weining, 2012. "Earnings restatements and differential timeliness of accounting conservatism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 489-503.
    9. Takuya Iwasaki & Shota Otomasa & Atsushi Shiiba & Akinobu Shuto, 2012. "Excess Executive Compensation and the Demand for Accounting Conservatism," Discussion Paper Series DP2012-08, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    10. Araceli Mora & Martin Walker, 2015. "The implications of research on accounting conservatism for accounting standard setting," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(5), pages 620-650, August.
    11. Valeri V. Nikolaev, 2010. "Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 137-176, March.
    12. Daniel Bens & Sterling Huang & Liang Tan & Wan Wongsunwai, 2020. "Contracting and Reporting Conservatism around a Change in Fiduciary Duties," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 2472-2500, December.
    13. Xi Li, 2015. "Accounting Conservatism and the Cost of Capital: An International Analysis," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(5-6), pages 555-582, June.
    14. Anantavrasilp, Sereeparp & Huijgen, Carel & Lubberink, Martien, 2021. "Do firms anticipate security issues by conservative reporting?," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2).
    15. Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina, 2008. "The role of information asymmetry and financial reporting quality in debt trading: Evidence from the secondary loan market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2-3), pages 240-260, December.
    16. Chengru Hu & Wei Jiang, 2019. "Managerial risk incentives and accounting conservatism," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 781-813, April.
    17. William Bradford & Chao Chen & Song Zhu, 2017. "Conservative Accounting, IFRS Convergence and Cash Dividend Payments: Evidence from China," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 23(3), pages 376-414, June.
    18. Ruch, George W. & Taylor, Gary, 2015. "Accounting conservatism: A review of the literature," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 17-38.
    19. Li Cui & Pamela Kent & Sujin Kim & Shan Li, 2021. "Accounting conservatism and firm performance during the COVID‐19 pandemic," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(4), pages 5543-5579, December.
    20. Todd A. Gormley & Bong Hwan Kim & Xiumin Martin, 2012. "Do Firms Adjust Their Timely Loss Recognition in Response to Changes in the Banking Industry?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 159-196, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Accounting Conservatism; Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings; Basu Measure; Risk; Asset Volatility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ibf:ijbfre:v:7:y:2013:i:1:p:55-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mercedes Jalbert (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.