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Evolutionary Stability of Kantian Optimization

Author

Listed:
  • Philip A. Curry

    (University of Waterloo)

  • John E. Roemer

    (Yale University)

Abstract

In nash equilibrium, agents are autarchic in their optimization protocol, whereas in Kantian equilibrium,they optimize in an interdependent way. Typically, researchers into the evolution of homo economicus treat preferences as being determined by selective adaptation, but hold fixed the optimization protocol as autarchic. here, we ask whether natural selection might choose the optimizing protocol to be either autarchic or interdependent. That is, will Kantian players, for whom the stable concept is Kantian equilibrium drive nash players (for whom the stable concept is nash equilibrium) to extinction, or otherwise? The answer depends upon whether players can signal their type to others.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip A. Curry & John E. Roemer, 2012. "Evolutionary Stability of Kantian Optimization," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 200(1), pages 131-146, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2012:v:200:i:1:p:131-146.
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Stark, Oded, 1993. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 149-155, May.
    2. Nick Netzer, 2009. "Evolution of Time Preferences and Attitudes toward Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 937-955, June.
    3. Arthur J. Robson & Larry Samuelson, 2009. "The Evolution of Time Preference with Aggregate Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1925-1953, December.
    4. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2001. "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 273-297, April.
    5. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    6. Curry, Philip A., 2001. "Decision Making under Uncertainty and the Evolution of Interdependent Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 357-369, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gregory Ponthiere, 2024. "Epictetusian rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(1), pages 219-262, August.
    2. Bezin, Emeline & Ponthière, Gregory, 2019. "The tragedy of the commons and socialization: Theory and policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    3. Gregory Ponthiere, 2024. "Epictetusian rationality and evolutionary stability," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 647-673, July.
    4. Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2018. "Evolution of preferences in group-structured populations: genes, guns, and culture," TSE Working Papers 18-888, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2019.
    5. Ponthiere, Gregory, 2024. "Stoicism and the Tragedy of the Commons," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1405, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    6. Roemer, John E., 2015. "Kantian optimization: A microfoundation for cooperation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 45-57.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Kantian equilibrium; nash equilibrium; evolutionary Stable Strategy; cooperation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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