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Evolutionary Game of Government Subsidy Strategy for Prefabricated Buildings Based on Prospect Theory

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  • Yu Liu
  • Dong Cai
  • Chunxiang Guo
  • Haizhen Huang

Abstract

Based on the prospect theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of government and construction units for the problem of poor subsidy construction of government-subsidized construction units and uses the replication dynamic equation to analyse the strategic choice of evolutionary games. The research shows that the evolutionary game system of the construction unit and the government cannot meet the government incentives, and the construction unit also adopts the stable state of the prefabricated building. In the long run, the government subsidy cannot determine whether or not the construction unit will adopt the prefabricated building, and it is the construction cost of the prefabricated building that determines. Therefore, the government's work should shift from subsidies to targeted incentives forconstruction units to reduce the cost of construction of prefabricated buildings. The unit levies an environmental tax and appropriately restricts the income from the traditional cast-in-place construction units, and, on the other hand, it increases the popularization of low-carbon and environmental protection of the fabricated buildings, so that more consumers can recognize the environmental benefits brought by the assembled buildings. It provides a reference for the government to promote the development of prefabricated buildings.

Suggested Citation

  • Yu Liu & Dong Cai & Chunxiang Guo & Haizhen Huang, 2020. "Evolutionary Game of Government Subsidy Strategy for Prefabricated Buildings Based on Prospect Theory," Mathematical Problems in Engineering, Hindawi, vol. 2020, pages 1-10, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:8863563
    DOI: 10.1155/2020/8863563
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    Cited by:

    1. Guoyong Yue & Zijian Zhao & Lei Dai & Hao Hu, 2024. "Research on Intercity Railway Subsidy Mechanism Optimization from the Perspective of a Government–Company Game Model: A Case Study of Henan Intercity Railway," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(17), pages 1-17, September.
    2. Song, Yang & Sahut, Jean-Michel & Zhang, Zhiyuan & Tian, Yifan & Hikkerova, Lubica, 2022. "The effects of government subsidies on the sustainable innovation of university-industry collaboration," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).
    3. Feng Li & Xuewan Du & Pengchao Zhang & Huimin Li & Xiaoxia Fei, 2023. "Co-Evolutionary Mechanism of Stakeholders’ Strategies in Comprehensive Agricultural Water Price Reform: The View of Evolutionary Game Based on Prospect Theory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(15), pages 1-31, August.
    4. Jiaqi Liu & Hucheng Xu & Xiaoheng Deng & Hui Liu & Deng Li, 2023. "A Location-Based Crowdsensing Incentive Mechanism Based on Ensemble Learning and Prospect Theory," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(16), pages 1-30, August.

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