Dynamic Control of Product Innovation, Advertising Effort, and Strategic Transfer-Pricing in a Marketing-Operations Interface

We develop a dynamic control model of a monopolist composed of two profit centers, e.g., an operations department in charge of the product innovation and a marketing department controlling advertising effort as well as the retail price. Meanwhile, knowledge accumulating in product innovation and advertising effort which lead to reducing the corresponding investment cost is considered. The customer inverse demand function depends jointly on the quality level as well as the product goodwill which can be improved by product innovation and advertising efforts. Our results show that the learning rates of product innovation and advertising effort affect the product innovation and advertising effort investments level. In addition, compared with the administered transfer-pricing, the negotiation between the two departments results in a lower transfer price as well as a higher retail price. In the meantime, the advertising effort is lower while the quality improvement effort is higher. What is more, higher profits to both departments and the firm can be brought about by the negotiation means.