Mathematical Problems in Engineering Pharmaceutical Cold Chain Transportation Decision Making under the Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism: A Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the cold chain transportation of medicines is becoming more and more critical to the quality and safety of drugs. In order to better motivate the logistics service providers to adopt the cold chain transportation strategy, this paper constructs a multiparty evolutionary game model composed of the government, logistics service providers, and medical institutions, and models behavioral strategies. The interaction is simulated and analyzed. Focusing on the contradictions between cost and service level in cold chain transportation, the revenue-sharing coefficient between medical institutions and logistics service providers and the government's reward and punishment mechanism are introduced. The results show the following: (1) a reasonable revenue sharing contract between the medical institution and logistics service provider will prompt the logistics service provider to use cold chain transportation. (2) With the government's penalties and rewards being further increased, the logistics service provider will tend to use noncold chain transportation. Therefore, the government must set a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism to ensure drug safety. (3) With the increasing revenue of the medical institution, the probability of the logistics service provider using noncold chain transportation decreases. In order to avoid medical malpractice related to noncold chain transportation, the government should appropriately adjust drug price restrictions to increase drug sales revenue. (4) With the rate of medical malpractice being increased, the evolution of each stakeholder to the equilibrium point of the game is accelerated.