IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/hin/jnddns/698270.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Complexity of a Duopoly Game in the Electricity Market with Delayed Bounded Rationality

Author

Listed:
  • Junhai Ma
  • Hongliang Tu

Abstract

According to a triopoly game model in the electricity market with bounded rational players, a new Cournot duopoly game model with delayed bounded rationality is established. The model is closer to the reality of the electricity market and worth spreading in oligopoly. By using the theory of bifurcations of dynamical systems, local stable region of Nash equilibrium point is obtained. Its complex dynamics is demonstrated by means of the largest Lyapunov exponent, bifurcation diagrams, phase portraits, and fractal dimensions. Since the output adjustment speed parameters are varied, the stability of Nash equilibrium gives rise to complex dynamics such as cycles of higher order and chaos. Furthermore, by using the straight-line stabilization method, the chaos can be eliminated. This paper has an important theoretical and practical significance to the electricity market under the background of developing new energy.

Suggested Citation

  • Junhai Ma & Hongliang Tu, 2012. "Complexity of a Duopoly Game in the Electricity Market with Delayed Bounded Rationality," Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, Hindawi, vol. 2012, pages 1-13, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:hin:jnddns:698270
    DOI: 10.1155/2012/698270
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/DDNS/2012/698270.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/DDNS/2012/698270.xml
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1155/2012/698270?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nálepová, Veronika & Lampart, Marek, 2024. "Impact of windfall tax on market dynamics: A Cournot oligopoly model with exogenous shocks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hin:jnddns:698270. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mohamed Abdelhakeem (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.hindawi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.