IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v16y2024i13p5381-d1421552.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Stay Vigilant in Peace Time? Antitakeover Provisions and Corporate Social Responsibility

Author

Listed:
  • Zhiying Hu

    (School of Economics and Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China)

  • Xiaobei Huang

    (School of Economics and Management, North China University of Technology, Beijing 100144, China)

  • Yunling Song

    (School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot 010021, China)

  • Wenhui Jin

    (School of Economics and Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China)

Abstract

We examine how antitakeover provisions (ATPs) impact corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure for Chinese listed firms. The empirical results show that the level of CSR disclosure is positively related to the level of ATPs, and this relationship is primarily observed in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Further evidence indicates that this association is most prevalent in observations with lower efficiency or higher legitimacy pressures. Our paper provides new evidence on the mixed motivations for CSR disclosure in Chinese firms and offers insights into the moderating effects of ATPs in the context of weak corporate governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhiying Hu & Xiaobei Huang & Yunling Song & Wenhui Jin, 2024. "Stay Vigilant in Peace Time? Antitakeover Provisions and Corporate Social Responsibility," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(13), pages 1-21, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:13:p:5381-:d:1421552
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/16/13/5381/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/16/13/5381/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter Wright & Stephen P. Ferris, 1997. "Agency Conflict And Corporate Strategy: The Effect Of Divestment On Corporate Value," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 77-83, January.
    2. Julian Atanassov, 2013. "Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(3), pages 1097-1131, June.
    3. Johnson, William C. & Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Yi, Sangho, 2015. "The bonding hypothesis of takeover defenses: Evidence from IPO firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 307-332.
    4. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003. "Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1043-1075, October.
    5. Fabrizio Zerbini, 2017. "CSR Initiatives as Market Signals: A Review and Research Agenda," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 1-23, November.
    6. Joern H. Block & Marcus Wagner, 2014. "The Effect of Family Ownership on Different Dimensions of Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Large US Firms," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(7), pages 475-492, November.
    7. Jordi Surroca & Josep A. Tribó, 2008. "Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(5‐6), pages 748-789, June.
    8. Ma Zhong & Rong Xu & Xinyi Liao & Shuangli Zhang, 2019. "Do CSR Ratings Converge in China? A Comparison Between RKS and Hexun Scores," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(14), pages 1-20, July.
    9. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 107-156.
    10. Haiyang Li & Yan Zhang, 2007. "The role of managers' political networking and functional experience in new venture performance: Evidence from China's transition economy," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(8), pages 791-804, August.
    11. Najah Attig & Narjess Boubakri & Sadok El Ghoul & Omrane Guedhami, 2016. "Firm Internationalization and Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 134(2), pages 171-197, March.
    12. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Stole, Lars A, 1993. "Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 719-729, June.
    13. Baysinger, Barry D & Butler, Henry N, 1985. "Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 101-124, Spring.
    14. Aleksandra Kacperczyk, 2009. "With greater power comes greater responsibility? takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 261-285, March.
    15. DeAngelo, Harry & Rice, Edward M., 1983. "Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 329-359, April.
    16. Ricky Y. K. Chan & Jennifer W. M. Lai & Namwoon Kim, 2022. "Strategic motives and performance implications of proactive versus reactive environmental strategies in corporate sustainable development," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(5), pages 2127-2142, July.
    17. Chen, Shenglan & Lin, Bingxuan & Lu, Rui & Ma, Hui, 2018. "The disciplinary effects of short sales on controlling shareholders," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 56-76.
    18. Xiaobei ‘‘Beryl’’ Huang & Luke Watson, 2015. "Corporate social responsibility research in accounting," Journal of Accounting Literature, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 34(1), pages 1-16, March.
    19. Knoeber, Charles R, 1986. "Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 155-167, March.
    20. Frattaroli, Marc, 2020. "Does protectionist anti-takeover legislation lead to managerial entrenchment?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 106-136.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chen, I-Ju & Hsu, Po-Hsuan & Wang, Yanzhi, 2022. "Staggered boards and product innovations: Evidence from Massachusetts State Bill HB 5640," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(4).
    2. Heli Wang & Shan Zhao & Jinyu He, 2016. "Increase in takeover protection and firm knowledge accumulation strategy," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(12), pages 2393-2412, December.
    3. Guernsey, Scott & Sepe, Simone M. & Serfling, Matthew, 2022. "Blood in the water: The value of antitakeover provisions during market shocks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1070-1096.
    4. Drobetz, W. & Momtaz, Paul P., 2020. "Antitakeover Provisions and Firm Value: New Evidence from the M&A Market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    5. Caroline Flammer & Aleksandra Kacperczyk, 2016. "The Impact of Stakeholder Orientation on Innovation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(7), pages 1982-2001, July.
    6. Ling Cen & Sudipto Dasgupta & Rik Sen, 2016. "Discipline or Disruption? Stakeholder Relationships and the Effect of Takeover Threat," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(10), pages 2820-2841, October.
    7. Carline, Nicholas F. & Gogineni, Sridhar, 2021. "Antitakeover provisions and investment in mergers and acquisitions: A causal reevaluation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    8. Mbanyele, William, 2021. "Staggered boards, unequal voting rights, poison pills and innovation intensity: New evidence from the Asian markets," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    9. Omer Unsal & Blake Rayfield, 2020. "Correction to: Corporate governance and employee treatment: Evidence from takeover defenses," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 44(2), pages 392-416, April.
    10. Rania Beji & Ouidad Yousfi & Nadia Loukil & Abdelwahed Omri, 2021. "Board Diversity and Corporate Social Responsibility: Empirical Evidence from France," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 133-155, September.
    11. Dittmar, Amy & Mahrt-Smith, Jan, 2007. "Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 599-634, March.
    12. Cremers, K.J. Martijn & Litov, Lubomir P. & Sepe, Simone M., 2017. "Staggered boards and long-term firm value, revisited," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(2), pages 422-444.
    13. John Wald & Sattar Mansi & Anh Nguyen, 2012. "Golden Parachutes, Incentives, and the Cost of Debt," Working Papers 0008, College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio.
    14. Bhargava, Rahul & Faircloth, Sheri & Zeng, Hongchao, 2017. "Takeover protection and stock price crash risk: Evidence from state antitakeover laws," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 177-184.
    15. Balachandran, Balasingham & Duong, Huu Nhan & Luong, Hoang & Nguyen, Lily, 2020. "Does takeover activity affect stock price crash risk? Evidence from international M&A laws," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    16. Michael Mayberry, 2020. "Good for managers, bad for society? Causal evidence on the association between risk‐taking incentives and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(9-10), pages 1182-1214, October.
    17. Souther, Matthew E., 2016. "The effects of takeover defenses: Evidence from closed-end funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 420-440.
    18. Sokolyk, Tatyana, 2011. "The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 612-627, June.
    19. Heidi Quah & Janto Haman & Dharmendra Naidu, 2021. "The effect of stock liquidity on investment efficiency under financing constraints and asymmetric information: Evidence from the United States," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(S1), pages 2109-2150, April.
    20. Chakraborty, Atreya & Rzakhanov, Zaur & Sheikh, Shahbaz, 2014. "Antitakeover provisions, managerial entrenchment and firm innovation," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 30-43.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:13:p:5381-:d:1421552. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.