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The Dynamic Evolution Law of Coal Mine Workers’ Behavior Risk Based on Game Theory

Author

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  • Jifeng Lu

    (College of Safety and Environmental Engineering, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China
    Min an Institute of Emergency and Safety Management of Qingdao West Coast New Area, Qingdao 266590, China)

  • Weihua Liu

    (State Nuclear Power Engineering Company, Shanghai 200233, China)

  • Kai Yu

    (College of Safety and Environmental Engineering, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China
    Min an Institute of Emergency and Safety Management of Qingdao West Coast New Area, Qingdao 266590, China)

  • Lujie Zhou

    (College of Safety and Environmental Engineering, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China)

Abstract

In the safety production system of coal mining enterprises, the income of workers affects the evolution of group behavior and then affects risky behaviors. Due to the nonlinearity and chaos of group behavior, its evolution is long and complex. This study investigated the dynamic evolution process of coal miners’ group behavior to explore the law of group safety behavior and effectively promoted the safety of group behavior. First, a questionnaire survey was conducted on the influencing factors of coal mine workers’ group safety behavior. Then, based on the results of the questionnaire, the coefficients of the influencing factors were obtained, and the game model was established. Finally, the game income was simulated and analyzed. The results showed that the income of workers was positively correlated with the safety of group behavior. Safety performance could effectively improve the level of group safety behavior. The safety management system of coal mining enterprises was further improved and expanded and was applied. The statistical analysis of the violations showed that the results of this study could be used to influence the risky group behavior of coal mine workers and improve the level of coal mine safety production.

Suggested Citation

  • Jifeng Lu & Weihua Liu & Kai Yu & Lujie Zhou, 2022. "The Dynamic Evolution Law of Coal Mine Workers’ Behavior Risk Based on Game Theory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(7), pages 1-16, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:7:p:4015-:d:781889
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    2. Liu, Huihui & Chen, ZhanMing & Wang, Jianliang & Fan, Jihong, 2017. "The impact of resource tax reform on China's coal industry," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 52-61.
    3. Aradhana Narang & A. J. Shaiju, 2021. "Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 304(1), pages 343-359, September.
    4. Rongwu Lu & Xinhua Wang & Hao Yu & Dan Li, 2018. "Multiparty Evolutionary Game Model in Coal Mine Safety Management and Its Application," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-10, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. You, Qi & Yu, Kai & Zhou, Lujie & Zhang, Jing & Lv, Maoyun & Wang, Jiansheng, 2023. "Research on risk analysis and prevention policy of coal mine workers' group behavior based on evolutionary game," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    2. Xingbang Qiang & Guoqing Li & Jie Hou & Xia Zhang & Yujia Liu, 2023. "Intelligent Safety Risk Analysis and Decision-Making System for Underground Metal Mines Based on Big Data," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-15, June.
    3. Min Zeng & Chuanzhou Dian & Yaoyao Wei, 2022. "Risk Assessment of Insider Threats Based on IHFACS-BN," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(1), pages 1-18, December.
    4. Jiao Liu & Shuang Li & Weijun Bao & Kun Xu, 2022. "Could the Management System of Safety Partnership Change Miners’ Unsafe Behavior?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(20), pages 1-14, October.

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