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The Impact of On-the-Job Consumption on the Sustainable Development of Enterprises

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  • Ping Wang

    (School of Economics and Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China
    School of Music, Yancheng Teachers University, Yancheng 224007, China)

  • Hua Bu

    (School of Economics and Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China)

  • Huaping Sun

    (School of Finance and Economics, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China)

Abstract

Under certain circumstances, on-the-job consumption is conducive to improving the resilience of the supply chain and the sustainable development ability of enterprises. Using China’s A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2019 as sample data in conjunction with the deconstructive analysis of on-the-job consumption, we used the multiple linear regression model of econometrics to deeply analyze the impact of on-the-job consumption on the sustainable development of enterprises, test the regulatory effect of innovation efficiency, and explore the governance effect of internal control and anti-corruption. Research shows that reasonable and excessive on-the-job consumption have positive and inhibitory effects, respectively, on the sustainable development of enterprises and the relationship between innovation efficiency and the sustainable development of enterprises. Compared to private enterprises, the positive effect of reasonable on-the-job consumption is smaller in state-owned enterprises, while the negative effect of excessive on-the-job consumption is larger in state-owned enterprises. Further research suggests that internal control can weaken the inhibitory effect of excessive on-the-job consumption on the positive relationship between the innovation efficiency and the sustainable development of enterprises, and the weakening effect is even greater after the implementation of anti-corruption policies. Anti-corruption policies and internal control can form a complementary force, effectively restrain the agency effect of excessive on-the-job consumption, and promote the sustainable development of enterprises. This research not only expands the research perspective of on-the-job consumption but also adds new theoretical explanations and empirical evidence for how to achieve the sustainable development of enterprises.

Suggested Citation

  • Ping Wang & Hua Bu & Huaping Sun, 2021. "The Impact of On-the-Job Consumption on the Sustainable Development of Enterprises," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(23), pages 1-18, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:13:y:2021:i:23:p:13478-:d:695924
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    Cited by:

    1. Wunhong Su & Liuzhen Zhang & Chao Ge & Shuai Chen, 2022. "Association between Internal Control and Sustainability: A Literature Review Based on the SOX Act Framework," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(15), pages 1-30, August.

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