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The Tragedy of the Commons as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Its Relevance for Sustainability Games

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  • Alessio Carrozzo Magli

    (Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126 Bologna, Italy)

  • Pompeo Della Posta

    (Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Via Ridolfi 10, 56124 Pisa, Italy)

  • Piero Manfredi

    (Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Via Ridolfi 10, 56124 Pisa, Italy)

Abstract

In the current battle for sustainability and climate, understanding the nature of sustainability games is of paramount importance, especially to inform appropriate policy actions to contrast the harmful effects of global climate change. Relatedly, there is no consensus in the literature on the proper game-theoretic representation of the so-called Tragedy of the Commons. A number of contributions have questioned the prisoner’s dilemma as an appropriate framework. In this work, we provide a representation that reconciles these two positions, confirming the ultimate nature of the Tragedy as a prisoner’s dilemma, rather than a coordination issue, and discuss the ensuing implications for sustainability policy interventions.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessio Carrozzo Magli & Pompeo Della Posta & Piero Manfredi, 2021. "The Tragedy of the Commons as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Its Relevance for Sustainability Games," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(15), pages 1-10, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:13:y:2021:i:15:p:8125-:d:598193
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aloysius Suratin & Suyud Warno Utomo & Dwi Nowo Martono & Kosuke Mizuno, 2023. "Indonesia’s Renewable Natural Resource Management in the Low-Carbon Transition: A Conundrum in Changing Trajectories," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(14), pages 1-17, July.
    2. Claudius Gros, 2022. "Generic catastrophic poverty when selfish investors exploit a degradable common resource," Papers 2208.08171, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.

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