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The More Democracy, the Better? On Whether Democracy Makes Societies Open

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  • Cristian López

    (Department of Philosophy, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland)

Abstract

It is a common view that Popper’s defense of the open society has been a defense of Western, liberal democracies. This seems to imply that by fostering democratic institutions we are ipso facto fostering open societies. I criticize this view by arguing that in-built incentives in democratic mechanisms move us away from (or hamper) the open society. Democracy promotes voters’ ignorance, indulges voters’ irrationality, and allows voters to externalize costs. This is contrary to well-informed, rational decisions and personal responsibility that lie at the fundamentals of the open society. I suggest that it has been free-market capitalism, or free-market societies, which has moved us closer to the ideal of the open society and which best realizes open society’s values.

Suggested Citation

  • Cristian López, 2024. "The More Democracy, the Better? On Whether Democracy Makes Societies Open," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 13(5), pages 1-22, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jscscx:v:13:y:2024:i:5:p:261-:d:1393385
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies," Introductory Chapters, in: The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, Princeton University Press.
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