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Loss-Averse Supply Chain Coordination with a Revenue-Sharing Contract

Author

Listed:
  • Ming Wu

    (School of Business, Macau University of Science and Technology, Macau SAR 999078, China
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Xin Li

    (School of Business, Macau University of Science and Technology, Macau SAR 999078, China
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Yuhao Chen

    (School of Business, Macau University of Science and Technology, Macau SAR 999078, China)

Abstract

As economic fluctuations and market uncertainty intensify, supply chain members face enormous challenges. To explore the role of revenue-sharing contracts in supply chain members with different risk preferences, we study the risk-averse two-stage supply chain coordination in a revenue-sharing contract under three different scenarios: the supplier is risk-averse and the retailer is risk-neutral, or the retailer is risk-averse and the supplier is risk-neutral, or both are risk-averse. We find that the revenue-sharing contract mechanism allows the supplier to offer a lower wholesale price, effectively bearing part of the retailer’s cost risk. In return, the retailer compensates the supplier with a larger portion of their revenue, and the lower wholesale price also stimulates the retailer’s desire to order more products. In addition, risk aversion always reduces the optimal order quantity in the supply chain. Interestingly, when the retailer’s risk aversion level is low, the supplier charges a higher wholesale price under the risk-averse supply chain than that under the risk-neutral supply chain. However, if the retailer’s risk aversion level is high enough, the supplier should charge a lower price to stimulate the retailer under the risk-averse supply chain to retain the order size to maintain the channel profit.

Suggested Citation

  • Ming Wu & Xin Li & Yuhao Chen, 2024. "Loss-Averse Supply Chain Coordination with a Revenue-Sharing Contract," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(6), pages 1-22, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:12:y:2024:i:6:p:844-:d:1356417
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    References listed on IDEAS

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