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Inferencing Space Travel Pricing from Mathematics of General Relativity Theory, Accounting Equation, and Economic Functions

Author

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  • Kang-Lin Peng

    (Faculty of International Tourism and Management, City University of Macau, Macau 999078, China)

  • Xunyue Xue

    (Faculty of International Tourism and Management, City University of Macau, Macau 999078, China)

  • Liqiong Yu

    (School of Economics and Management, Guangdong University of Petrochemical Technology, Maoming 525000, China)

  • Yixin Ren

    (Faculty of International Tourism and Management, City University of Macau, Macau 999078, China)

Abstract

This study derives space travel pricing by Walrasian Equilibrium, which is logical reasoning from the general relativity theory (GRT), the accounting equation, and economic supply and demand functions. The Cobb–Douglas functions embed the endogenous space factor as new capital to form the space travel firm’s production function, which is also transformed into the consumer’s utility function. Thus, the market equilibrium occurs at the equivalence of supply and demand functions, like the GRT, which presents the equivalence between the spatial geometric tensor and the energy–momentum tensor, explaining the principles of gravity and the motion of space matter in the spacetime framework. The mathematical axiomatic set theory of the accounting equation explains the equity premium effect that causes a short-term accounting equation inequality, then reaches the equivalence by suppliers’ incremental equity through the closing accounts process of the accounting cycle. On the demand side, the consumption of space travel can be assumed as a value at risk (VaR) investment to attain the specific spacetime curvature in an expected orbit. Spacetime market equilibrium is then achieved to construct the space travel pricing model. The methodology of econophysics and the analogy method was applied to infer space travel pricing with the model of profit maximization, single-mindedness, and envy-free pricing in unit-demand markets. A case study with simulation was conducted for empirical verification of the mathematical models and algorithm. The results showed that space travel pricing remains associated with the principle of market equilibrium, but needs to be extended to the spacetime tensor of GRT.

Suggested Citation

  • Kang-Lin Peng & Xunyue Xue & Liqiong Yu & Yixin Ren, 2024. "Inferencing Space Travel Pricing from Mathematics of General Relativity Theory, Accounting Equation, and Economic Functions," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(5), pages 1-15, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:12:y:2024:i:5:p:757-:d:1350574
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gul, Faruk & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 95-124, July.
    2. Phlips,Louis, 1983. "The Economics of Price Discrimination," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521283946, September.
    3. Yasuhide Okuyama & Stephanie E. Chang (ed.), 2004. "Modeling Spatial and Economic Impacts of Disasters," Advances in Spatial Science, Springer, number 978-3-540-24787-6.
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