The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Capital Structure Decisions: Evidence from China

The determination of the capital structure is a critical component of a company’s financial decision-making process. The question of how to optimize a firm’s capital structure to increase its value has been a significant topic of interest within the financial community. The employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) has developed rapidly in China’s capital market over the past decade, providing a suitable context for studying the impact of employee equity incentives on capital structure decisions. This paper employs cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression models and unbalanced panel fixed effect models to investigate the impact of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) on firms’ capital structure decisions. The analysis is conducted on a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The research considers both static capital structure choice and dynamic capital structure adjustment. We find that the implementation of an ESOP reduces the level of corporate debt and accelerates the dynamic adjustment of capital structure, suggesting that employee equity incentives play a role in optimizing firms’ capital structure decisions. We also find that the impact of ESOPs on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure is asymmetric. Specifically, the implementation of ESOPs markedly accelerates the downward adjustment of capital structure, yet has no impact on the upward adjustment of capital structure. Further analysis demonstrates that the impact of ESOPs on capital structure decisions is contingent upon the macroeconomic environment, industry characteristics, corporate governance, and ESOP contract designs. First, the optimization of ESOPs on capital structure decisions is more pronounced in an economic boom environment, in a poor market climate, or in competitive industries. Second, the reduction effect of ESOPs on corporate debt is more pronounced in non-state-owned companies, high-tech companies and those with lower ownership concentration. In contrast, the acceleration effect of ESOPs on capital structure adjustment is more pronounced in state-owned companies, non-high-tech companies and those with higher ownership concentration. Ultimately, ESOPs financed by loans from a firm’s major shareholders—or with a longer lock-up period, smaller shareholding size or executive subscription ratio—demonstrate a more pronounced optimization effect on capital structure decisions. This paper not only contributes to the existing literature on the relationship between equity incentives and capital structure decisions, but also provides guidance for listed companies on the reasonable design of their ESOPs and the optimization of their capital structure decisions.