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Analyzing and Simulating Evolution of Subsidy–Operation Strategies for Multi-Type China Railway Express Operation Market

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  • Fenling Feng

    (School of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410075, China)

  • Ze Zhang

    (School of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410075, China)

  • Mingxu Cai

    (School of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410075, China)

  • Chengguang Liu

    (Big Data Institute, Central South University, Changsha 410075, China)

Abstract

The China Railway Express stands as a crucial facilitator of trade across the land routes of Eurasian countries. During its initial developmental phase, the China Railway Express heavily relied on subsidies to establish a market presence. This dependency hindered its independence and sustainability. Hence, there exists a paramount need to regulate the subsidy market and institute more rational operation strategies. This study focuses on the dynamics of the subsidies and operations in the market for the China Railway Express under different types of development models. It uses evolutionary game theory and the Activity-Based Costing (ABC) method to describe the dynamic evolution of four cases between local governments and operating-platform enterprises. Four corresponding lines were selected as instances: from Xiamen, Wuxi, Changsha, and Zhengzhou to Malaszewicze, Poland. The findings conclude that the optimal conditions for the development of the China Railway Express market exist when operating-platform enterprises possess higher assets and the local government’s supervision and punishment of the market are relatively weaker. This study offers valuable insights for guiding subsidy and operational decision-making processes for the China Railway Express.

Suggested Citation

  • Fenling Feng & Ze Zhang & Mingxu Cai & Chengguang Liu, 2024. "Analyzing and Simulating Evolution of Subsidy–Operation Strategies for Multi-Type China Railway Express Operation Market," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(11), pages 1-29, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:12:y:2024:i:11:p:1640-:d:1400433
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    References listed on IDEAS

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