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Why Insurers Are Wrong about Adverse Selection

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  • R. Guy Thomas

    (School of Mathematics, Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 7FS, UK)

Abstract

Insurers typically argue that regulatory limits on their ability to use genetic tests will induce ‘adverse selection’; they say that this has disadvantages not just for insurers, but also for society as a whole. I argue that, even on its own terms, this argument is often flawed. From the viewpoint of society as a whole, not all adverse selection is adverse. Limits on genetic discrimination that induce the right amount of adverse selection (but not too much adverse selection) can increase ‘loss coverage’, and so make insurance work better for society as a whole.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Guy Thomas, 2018. "Why Insurers Are Wrong about Adverse Selection," Laws, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-8, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jlawss:v:7:y:2018:i:2:p:13-:d:141165
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. Guy Thomas, 2008. "Loss Coverage as a Public Policy Objective for Risk Classification Schemes," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 75(4), pages 997-1018, December.
    2. Thomas C. Buchmueller & Sabina Ohri, 2006. "Health Insurance Take-up by the Near Elderly," NBER Working Papers 11951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Mark V. Pauly & Kate H. Withers & Krupa Subramanian-Viswana & Jean Lemaire & John C. Hershey, 2003. "Price Elasticity of Demand for Term Life Insurance and Adverse Selection," NBER Working Papers 9925, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Barry K. Goodwin, 1993. "An Empirical Analysis of the Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 75(2), pages 425-434.
    5. Babbel, David F, 1985. "The Price Elasticity of Demand for Whole Life Insurance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(1), pages 225-239, March.
    6. Hao, MingJie & Macdonald, Angus S. & Tapadar, Pradip & Thomas, R. Guy, 2018. "Insurance loss coverage and demand elasticities," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 15-25.
    7. Krupa S. Viswanathan & Jean Lemaire & Kate Withers & Katrina Armstrong & Agnieszka Baumritter & John C. Hershey & Mark V. Pauly & David A. Asch, 2007. "Adverse Selection in Term Life Insurance Purchasing due to the BRCA1/2 Genetic Test and Elastic Demand," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(1), pages 65-86, March.
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