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Do Board Characteristics Matter for Growth Firms? Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Qiuwei Li

    (School of Finance, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China)

  • Wei Zhou

    (School of Finance, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China)

  • Hui Zhou

    (Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Auckland, Auckland 1010, New Zealand)

  • Jiaxuan Chen

    (Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Auckland, Auckland 1010, New Zealand)

Abstract

Previous research on the effect of board characteristics mostly examines established firms. This raises the question of whether the findings from the board characteristics literature are applicable to rapidly growing enterprises, as their corporate governance landscape can be very different from that in large, mature companies. Our paper extends the corporate governance literature by investigating the performance implications of board characteristics in startups using a unique set of firms: 121 startups operating in the information technology industry listed on the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in China. Using a firm performance indicator constructed through the factor analysis method, we find significant correlations between firm performance and board size, age structure, board meeting frequency, and board ownership of shares. Our findings contribute to the corporate governance literature by shedding new light on the performance implications of board characteristics for startups operating in fast-paced industries.

Suggested Citation

  • Qiuwei Li & Wei Zhou & Hui Zhou & Jiaxuan Chen, 2021. "Do Board Characteristics Matter for Growth Firms? Evidence from China," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(8), pages 1-9, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jjrfmx:v:14:y:2021:i:8:p:380-:d:615846
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nikhil Ramkrishna Bandodkar & Renu Singh, 2022. "Small and Startup IT Firms, Information Chasms, and the Market for Acquisitions," Businesses, MDPI, vol. 2(3), pages 1-21, September.

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