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A Blockchain Technology Introduction Strategy for Asymmetric Sharing Platforms under Different Homing Behaviors of Both Sides

Author

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  • Libin Guo

    (School of Management Science, Qufu Normal University, Rizhao 276826, China)

  • Xiangtian Guo

    (School of Management Science, Qufu Normal University, Rizhao 276826, China)

Abstract

To address user privacy concerns and improve user trust levels, sharing platforms are commencing to focus on investing in blockchain technology. This study focuses on blockchain technology investment and pricing strategies for two asymmetric sharing platforms. By constructing a Hotelling model, we investigate the investment strategies of the two asymmetric platforms regarding blockchain technology under different user attribution behaviours, i.e., single-homing or multi-homing, and the optimal pricing under different investment decisions. Afterwards, we compare and analyse the investment strategies under different conditions, obtain the influence of relevant market factors on the pricing strategies of the platforms, and finally determine the optimal timing of blockchain technology investment for asymmetric sharing platforms. The results indicate that when users’ perception of blockchain value is high, both platforms are motivated to introduce blockchain technology, and, conversely, a stronger platform exits the blockchain market. In multi-homing markets, platforms are more likely to implement blockchain strategies and the cost of technology investment is significantly higher than in a single-homing market. In addition, we also find that the degree of differentiation has a significant impact on the blockchain strategies of weaker platform under multi-homing market.

Suggested Citation

  • Libin Guo & Xiangtian Guo, 2022. "A Blockchain Technology Introduction Strategy for Asymmetric Sharing Platforms under Different Homing Behaviors of Both Sides," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(23), pages 1-22, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:19:y:2022:i:23:p:16060-:d:989725
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    References listed on IDEAS

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