Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

Although the issue of cooperative emission reduction in supply chains has been extensively studied, there is little literature that considers the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on their purchasing behavior in the issue of dual-channel supply chain cooperative emission reduction. In order to explore the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on the balanced emission reduction decisions and profit of dual-channel supply chain members, we establish a dual-channel supply chain emission reduction dynamic optimization model, use differential game theory to solve the manufacturer’s optimal emission reduction investment and the retailer’s optimal low-carbon publicity investment strategies under four different decision scenarios, and analyze them in detail. In addition, we also design an effective low-carbon publicity cost-sharing contract to achieve coordination of the supply chain. The research results show that the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and retailer and the overall profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision scenario are better than those of decentralized decision scenario. When the initial reference low-carbon level is low, the online and offline reference low-carbon effects are beneficial to the manufacturer and retailer. When the initial low-carbon goodwill is high, it is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer to increase consumer recognition of low-carbon goodwill. When the ratio of low-carbon publicity cost sharing provided by the manufacturer to the retailer is within a reasonable range, the cost-sharing contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.