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An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Author

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  • Lingyan Xu

    (Management School, Jiangsu University, 301 Xuefu Road, Zhenjiang 212013, China
    Department of Systems Design Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada)

  • Zhuoyun Zhou

    (Management School, Jiangsu University, 301 Xuefu Road, Zhenjiang 212013, China)

  • Jianguo Du

    (Management School, Jiangsu University, 301 Xuefu Road, Zhenjiang 212013, China)

Abstract

This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control by stakeholders including local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between new agricultural operators and traditional farmers under the guidance of local governments, by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that new agricultural operators play a leading role in agricultural non-point source pollution control, whose strategies have effects such as technology spillover. The rewards from the superior government will support local governments in taking proactive action in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control, and then local governments can offer technical support and subsidies to new agricultural operators and traditional farmers for reducing their costs. Furthermore, this paper also finds that there are green synergy effects among the groups, where the variations of parameters and strategies by one group would affect the two others. Additionally, agricultural land operation rights transfers would cause traditional farmers to take more time to cooperate in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control. In order to promote the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to reduce their costs and improve incentives, as well as to increase the common interests among groups and enhance their green synergy effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Lingyan Xu & Zhuoyun Zhou & Jianguo Du, 2020. "An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(7), pages 1-19, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:17:y:2020:i:7:p:2472-:d:341526
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jianguo Du & Zhuoyun Zhou & Lingyan Xu, 2020. "Evolutionary Game Mechanism on Complex Networks of Green Agricultural Production under Intensive Management Pattern," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2020, pages 1-13, March.
    2. Yunpeng Yang & Weixin Yang, 2019. "Does Whistleblowing Work for Air Pollution Control in China? A Study Based on Three-party Evolutionary Game Model under Incomplete Information," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-20, January.
    3. Song Jiang & Shuang Qiu & Hong Zhou & Meilan Chen, 2019. "Can FinTech Development Curb Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution?," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(22), pages 1-22, November.
    4. Hamed Poorsepahy-Samian & Reza Kerachian & Mohammad Nikoo, 2012. "Water and Pollution Discharge Permit Allocation to Agricultural Zones: Application of Game Theory and Min-Max Regret Analysis," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 26(14), pages 4241-4257, November.
    5. Matteo Zavalloni & Meri Raggi & Davide Viaggi, 2019. "Agri-environmental Policies and Public Goods: An Assessment of Coalition Incentives and Minimum Participation Rules," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 72(4), pages 1023-1040, April.
    6. Yang Ding & Fei Dong & Jinyong Zhao & Wenqi Peng & Quchang Chen & Bing Ma, 2020. "Non-Point Source Pollution Simulation and Best Management Practices Analysis Based on Control Units in Northern China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(3), pages 1-17, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ning Zhou & Fanglei Zhong & Yanjie Yin, 2023. "Does Livelihood Determine Attitude? The Impact of Farmers’ Livelihood Capital on the Performance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Management: An Empirical Investigation in Yilong Lake Basin,," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 13(5), pages 1-22, May.
    2. Wenke Wang & Jue Wang & Kebei Liu & Yenchun Jim Wu, 2020. "Overcoming Barriers to Agriculture Green Technology Diffusion through Stakeholders in China: A Social Network Analysis," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(19), pages 1-22, September.
    3. Qizheng He & Yong Sun & Maoan Yi, 2023. "Evolutionary Game of Pesticide Reduction Management for Sustainable Agriculture: An Analysis Based on Local Governments, Farmers, and Consumers," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(12), pages 1-19, June.
    4. Lin Feng & Lingyan Xu & Zhuoyun Zhou & Jianguo Du & Dandan Wang, 2022. "The Influence of Social Preference and Governments’ Strong Reciprocity on Agricultural Green Production Networks under Intensive Management in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(23), pages 1-29, December.
    5. Tiening Cui & Zhang Si, 2022. "Driving Mechanism for Multi-Level Governance of Domestic Waste Sorting Based on Social Network Analysis and Interpretative Structural Modeling," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 12(6), pages 1-7.
    6. Feixiao Wang & Yaoqun Xu, 2022. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Quality of Agricultural Products in Supply Chain," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 12(10), pages 1-16, September.

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