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Cost-Sharing of Ecological Construction Based on Trapezoidal Intuitionistic Fuzzy Cooperative Games

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  • Jiacai Liu

    (College of Transportation and Civil Engineering, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002, China)

  • Wenjian Zhao

    (Jinshan College, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002, China)

Abstract

There exist some fuzziness and uncertainty in the process of ecological construction. The aim of this paper is to develop a direct and an effective simplified method for obtaining the cost-sharing scheme when some interested parties form a cooperative coalition to improve the ecological environment of Min River together. Firstly, we propose the solution concept of the least square prenucleolus of cooperative games with coalition values expressed by trapezoidal intuitionistic fuzzy numbers. Then, based on the square of the distance in the numerical value between two trapezoidal intuitionistic fuzzy numbers, we establish a corresponding quadratic programming model to obtain the least square prenucleolus, which can effectively avoid the information distortion and uncertainty enlargement brought about by the subtraction of trapezoidal intuitionistic fuzzy numbers. Finally, we give a numerical example about the cost-sharing of ecological construction in Fujian Province in China to show the validity, applicability, and advantages of the proposed model and method.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiacai Liu & Wenjian Zhao, 2016. "Cost-Sharing of Ecological Construction Based on Trapezoidal Intuitionistic Fuzzy Cooperative Games," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 13(11), pages 1-12, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:13:y:2016:i:11:p:1102-:d:82390
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    References listed on IDEAS

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