Differential Games of Cournot Oligopoly with Consideration of Pollution, Network Structure, and Continuous Updating
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- Kawaguchi, Kazuhito & Morimoto, Hiroaki, 2007. "Long-run average welfare in a pollution accumulation model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 703-720, February.
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- Petrosjan, Leon & Zaccour, Georges, 2003. "Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 381-398, January.
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Keywords
differential game theory; Cournot oligopoly; network structure; continuous updating; time consistency; subgame perfectness; imputation distribution procedure;All these keywords.
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