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Information Design for Multiple Interdependent Defenders: Work Less, Pay Off More

Author

Listed:
  • Chenghan Zhou

    (Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA)

  • Andrew Spivey

    (Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, USA)

  • Haifeng Xu

    (Department of Computer Science and Data Science Institute, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60605, USA)

  • Thanh H. Nguyen

    (Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, USA)

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of information design in a general security game setting in which multiple self-interested defenders attempt to provide protection simultaneously for the same set of important targets against an unknown attacker. A principal, who can be one of the defenders, has access to certain private information (i.e., attacker type), whereas other defenders do not. We investigate the question of how that principal, with additional private information, can influence the decisions of the defenders by partially and strategically revealing her information. In particular, we develop a polynomial time ellipsoid algorithm to compute an optimal private signaling scheme. Our key finding is that the separation oracle in the ellipsoid approach can be carefully reduced to bipartite matching. Furthermore, we introduce a compact representation of any ex ante persuasive signaling schemes by exploiting intrinsic security resource allocation structures, enabling us to compute an optimal scheme significantly faster. Our experiment results show that by strategically revealing private information, the principal can significantly enhance the protection effectiveness for the targets.

Suggested Citation

  • Chenghan Zhou & Andrew Spivey & Haifeng Xu & Thanh H. Nguyen, 2023. "Information Design for Multiple Interdependent Defenders: Work Less, Pay Off More," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:14:y:2023:i:1:p:12-:d:1051042
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vicki Bier & Santiago Oliveros & Larry Samuelson, 2007. "Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 563-587, August.
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2016. "Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    3. Powell, Robert, 2007. "Defending against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 527-541, August.
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