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The Risks of Russian Banks Before and After Recognition of Being Systemically Important Financial Institutions

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  • Yulia S. Evlakhova

    (Rostov State University of Economics, Rostov-on-Don 344002, Russia)

Abstract

After reviewing of the concept of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and identifying such global and national companies, the authors present the first investigation of Russian systemically important banks’ behavior before and after the publication of the list of systemically important financial institutions. The authors’ method is based on assessment of operational risks during two periods (Jan 1, 2013 — Jan 1, 2015 and Jan 1, 2016 — Jan 1, 2018). The analysis results show that the level of Russian banks’ risks decreased after the publication of the list of systemically important financial institutions, and thus Russian systemically important banks’ behavior did not coincide with the behavior of global and foreign institutions. The authors explain this discrepancy with the fact that the macroeconomic situation affected banking risks more than the publication of the list of systemically important financial institutions did. The authors conclude with a suggestion to continue the investigation of Russian systemically important banks’ behavior by expanding the risk types. These and other new results would influence the regulatory regime for systemically important financial institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Yulia S. Evlakhova, 2019. "The Risks of Russian Banks Before and After Recognition of Being Systemically Important Financial Institutions," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 3, pages 55-63, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:fru:finjrn:190304:p:55-63
    DOI: 10.31107/2075-1990-2019-3-55-63
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    systemically important banks; moral hazard; operational risks; state financial support; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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